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INTRODUCTION
'n 1991, Florence Dolan applied to the City Planning Commission of
.the City of Tigard, Oregon ("City") for a permit to expand her re-
tail electric and plumbing supply business.' As a condition of the de-
velopment permit, the Commission required Dolan to dedicate to the
City, without compensation, ten percent of her property to be used for
a greenway and a pedestrian/bicycle path.2 Consequently, Dolan chal-
lenged the dedication requirement as a taking of her property without
just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Consti-
tution, appealing her case all the way to the United States Supreme
Court.3
This past term, in Dolan v. City of Tigard,4 the Supreme Court held
that the dedication requirement imposed by the City would constitute
an unconstitutional taking of Dolan's property unless (1) there was an
"essential nexus" between the "legitimate state interest" for the dedi-
cation requirement and the dedication requirement itself,5 and (2) the
nature and degree of the dedication requirement was "roughly pro-
portional" to the projected impacts of the proposed development of
the landowner's property.6 With regard to the second requirement,
the Court imposed a burden on the City to make "some sort of indi-
vidualized determination that the [condition] is related both in nature
and extent to the impact of the proposed development."7
The most significant aspect of the Dolan decision is that it shifts the
burden to the government to justify the constitutionality of particular
conditions imposed in a permit authorizing development of a land-
owner's property, rather than placing the burden on the claimant to
* Assistant Professor of Law, Mercer University Law School. Prior to his ap-
pointment to the Mercer faculty, the author served as a trial attorney in the Environ-
ment and Natural Resources Division of the United States Department of Justice and
as an attorney in the Office of Chief Counsel for the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Resources. The views expressed in this Article are the author's and
do not represent the views or policies of any past or present employers.
1. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2313 (1994).
2. Id at 2314.
3. Id. at 2315-16.
4. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
5. Id. at 2317.
6. Id. at 2319-20.
7. Id
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demonstrate that the conditions are unconstitutional. Property rights
advocates have argued that the decision has broad implications, and
that the Dolan analysis and its burden shift apply not only to permit
conditions involving dedications of property, but also to a wide range
of permit conditions, including nonpossessory land-use restrictions,
such as conservation easements and mitigation requirements imposed
by federal and state wetland and endangered species programs.'
In response to those assertions, this Article explores the potential
impact of the Dolan decision on the wetlands permitting program
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("Clean Water Act").9
Part I provides an overview to the values and functions of wetlands,
the wetlands permitting process under the Clean Water Act, and the
concepts of compensatory mitigation' ° and mitigation banking. Part
II discusses the traditional takings analysis that would apply to review
of mitigation conditions in wetlands development permits if Dolan did
not apply to such conditions. Part III examines the Dolan decision
and its predecessor, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission." Part
IV explains why the Dolan decision should be limited to cases involv-
ing permit conditions on dedications of property to the government
(or other actions that constitute "per se" takings) and should not be
extended to cases involving nonpossessory land-use restriction permit
conditions, such as wetlands mitigation requirements.' 2 Lastly, Part V
assumes, arguendo, that the Dolan burden shift will be applied to wet-
lands mitigation conditions and explores whether the shift will have
any discernible impact on the ability of the government to impose mit-
igation requirements on wetlands developers or to accept mitigation
banking proposals as an appropriate form of mitigation.
8. Paul D. Kamenar, Nollan, Dolan, and Beyond, THE RECORDER, Sept. 15,
1994, at 7.
9. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
10. When the federal government issues a permit that authorizes a landowner to
destroy wetlands in the course of his or her development, the permit often includes
conditions requiring the developer to "mitigate" the damage to the wetlands caused
by the development by creating, restoring, or enhancing other wetlands. See discus-
sion infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
11. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
12. Part IV also examines several other questions that were not resolved by the
Court. Specifically, Part IV explores whether it is significant, for purposes of takings
analysis, that the permit condition challenged in Dolan was imposed through adjudi-
cation and whether wetland mitigation requirements could be made more constitu-
tionally defensible if they were imposed pursuant to regulations that described the
type and amount of mitigation required for development of wetlands. Part IV also
notes that the Dolan Court did not clearly articulate whether the burden shift im-
posed by the Court is a shift in the burden of production, a shift in the burden of
persuasion, or both.
WETLANDS
I. WETLANDS AND THE CLEAN WATER Acr
A. Wetland Values and Functions
Regardless of whether one considers the question from an eco-
nomic perspective or an ecological perspective, the reasons for pro-
tecting and preserving our nation's wetlands are overwhelming.1 3
Wetlands play a crucial role in improving water quality by removing
excess nutrients, sediments, and pollutants from the water flowing
through them.14 In light of their ability to filter a variety of pollutants,
wetlands have even been used in processes to neutralize acid mine
drainage and to treat municipal sewage.'"
Wetlands also aid in the prevention of flooding by temporarily stor-
ing flood waters, thus slowing the velocity of the flood waters and low-
ering flood crests.16 In addition, wetlands reduce soil erosion' 7 and
provide critical habitat for countless species of migratory waterfowl
and endangered and threatened species.'8 Although wetlands com-
prise less than five percent of the nation's land,'9 they provide critical
habitat for one-third of the nation's endangered species.2"
Therefore, wetlands clearly serve a vital ecological purpose. More-
over, wetlands serve a more tangible economic function because they
can produce enormous quantities of natural products, such as timber,
cranberries, blueberries, wild rice, fish, shellfish, and peat.2 ' Finally,
wetlands provide less tangible, but irreplaceable, recreational, educa-
tional, and aesthetic benefits.22
13. For a general discussion of the functions and values provided by wetlands, see
Stephen M. Johnson, Federal Regulation of Isolated Wetlands, 23 ENVTL. L. 1, 2-3(1993).
14. Id.
15. See James Gusek, Constructed Wetlands-Passive Treatment of Mine Drainage,
MINING J., Feb. 22, 1991, at 6 (discussing projects using wetlands to treat acid mine
drainage at seven sites operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority and at a "Big 5"
Tunnel experimental constructed wetland project in Idaho Springs, Colorado); Lynn
MacDonald, Water Pollution Solution: Build a Marsh, AM. FORESTS, July 1994, at 26
(discussing the use of constructed wetlands for sewage treatment in Arcata, Califor-
nia, Orlando, Florida, and Hillsboro, North Dakota, and indicating that as many as
300 municipalities in the U.S. may be using "natural" sewage treatment systems).
16. Johnson, supra note 13, at 3 n.9.
17. Id. at 3.
18. Id. at 3 n.11.
19. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, WETLANDS: THEIR USE AND REGU-
LATION 1 (1984) (wetlands "comprise about 5 percent of the contiguous United States
and about 60 percent of Alaska").
20. William L. Want, Federal Wetlands Law: The Cases and the Problems, 8 HARV.
ENVrL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1984) (citing Hearings on S. 777 Before the Subcomm. on Envi-
ronmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Environmental and Public Works, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., app. on Wetlands Values, at 4 (1982) (Hair, J., testimony on behalf of
12 environmental groups)).
21. Johnson, supra note 13, at 3 n.12:
22. Id. at 3.
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Even wetlands that were degraded and restored,23 and artificially
created wetlands,' have exhibited a variety of these "functional val-
ues."2  Obviously, not every wetland provides all of these values since
no two wetlands are exactly the same. The values provided by a par-
ticular wetland are tied closely to its location within a watershed. 6
For instance, a prairie pothole in North Dakota may provide habitat
support for migratory birds because it is in their flyway, but may pro-
vide little flood prevention value because it is isolated from other sur-
face water. Comparing the values of different wetlands is complicated
by the difficulty of quantifying functional values, 7 such as erosion
prevention and habitat protection.'
B. Protection of Wetlands Under the Clean Water Act
Although wetlands provide a vast array of economic and environ-
mental benefits, those benefits have often been ignored in the interest
of the short-term economic gains provided by the housing develop-
ments and shopping malls built in their place. More than one-half of
the wetlands that once existed in the contiguous forty-eight states are
gone,2 9 and current losses are estimated at 350,000 to 500,000 acres
per year.3°
While the Clean Water Act does not explicitly establish a wetlands
protection program, its provisions have been employed to slow the
further destruction of wetlands. The Act establishes a comprehensive
program of water pollution research and control to "restore and main-
tain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's wa-
ters."'3 1 To achieve those goals, the Act prohibits the discharge of
23. See John Walter, What Value Wetlands?, SUCCESSFUL FARMING,; Sept. 1992, at
25 (discussing the efficiency of restored wetlands in removing nitrates, sediments, and
pesticides from water in farming).
24. See supra note 15. EPA has provided funding for construction of seventeen
wetland wastewater treatment systems in ten states. MacDonald, supra note 15, at 26.
25. "Functional value" is the term used by regulators, scientists, and planners to
refer to the roles that wetlands perform. Michael G. Le Desma, Note, A Sound of
Thunder: Problems and Prospects in Wetland Mitigation Banking, 19 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 497 (1994).
26. James M. McElfish, Jr., Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 1994 A.B.A. SEC. NAT.
RES. ENERGY & ENVTL. L., 9TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON WETLANDS LAW AND
REGULATION L-14.
27. Le Desma, supra note 25, at 502.
28. McElfish, supra note 26, at L-9 to L-14. There are, however, some scientifi-
cally accepted techniques for assessing "functional values" of wetlands. Currently,
the techniques that are generally recognized by experts in the field are the Habitat
Evaluation Procedure ("HEP") and the Wetlands Evaluation Technique ("WET").
WILLIAM L. WANT, LAW OF WETLANDS REGULATION § 6.10[3] at 6-33 (1989).
29. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WETLANDS OVERVIEW 11-12 (1991) (citing
THOMAS E. DAHL, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., WETLANDS LOSSES IN THE UNITED
STATES: 1780s TO 1980s (1990)).
30. THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, PROTECTING AMERICA'S WETLANDS: AN
ACrION AGENDA 8-12 (1988).
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).
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dredged or fill materials3" into "navigable waters," which has been in-
terpreted to include wetlands,33 without a permit. 34
Section 404 of the Act establishes the wetlands permit program,
which is jointly administered by the United States Army Corps of En-
gineers ("Corps") and the United States Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA").35 Although the Corps has the primary authority to
issue § 404 permits under the Act, 36 it must apply § 404(b)(1) guide-
lines developed by the EPA to determine whether to issue a permit.37
The § 404(b)(1) guidelines place several important limits on the
Corps' authority to issue permits authorizing development in wet-
lands.38 First, no discharge of dredged or fill material is allowed under
the guidelines if there is a "practicable alternative to the discharge
which would have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem. '39 In
other words, if a proposed development project can be completed
without destroying wetlands, the Corps cannot issue a permit that
would allow the destruction of wetlands. When a permit applicant
proposes to discharge dredged or fill material into wetlands and the
proposed project is not water-dependent (e.g., a dock), the guidelines
create a presumption that "practicable alternatives" to the discharge
are available, and the burden is on the applicant to rebut that pre-
sumption.40 The analysis that the Corps conducts pursuant to this lim-
itation is referred to as an "alternatives analysis."
Moreover, the guidelines provide that "no discharge of dredged or
fill material shall be permitted unless appropriate and practicable
32. "Dredged material" is "material that is excavated or dredged from waters of
the United States." 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1994). The "discharge of dredged material
means any addition of dredged material into... the waters of the United States." Id.
§ 323.2(d). "Fill material" includes "any material used for the primary purpose of
replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of changing the bottom elevation of a
waterbody." Id. § 323.2(e). The "discharge of fill material means the addition of fill
material into waters of the United States." Id. § 323.2(f).
33. See id. § 328.3(a); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (1994).
34. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1344(a) (1988).
35. Id. § 1344.
36. The EPA is, however, authorized to "veto" the issuance of a § 404 permit in
certain circumstances. Id. § 1344(c).
37. Id. § 1344(b). The Corps cannot issue a permit authorizing a discharge of
dredged or fill material into navigable waters unless the discharge complies with the
§ 404(b)(1) guidelines. 40 C.F.R. § 230.12 (1994). In addition to EPA's guidelines,
the Corps evaluates § 404 permit applications under a "public interest" analysis estab-
lished by Corps regulations, which involves an "evaluation of the probable impacts...
of the proposed activity and its intended use on the public interest." 33 C.F.R.
§ 320.4(a) (1994).
38. The guidelines provide information on unacceptable adverse impacts on
aquatic ecosystems and are developed by the EPA after consideration of the effect of
discharges on human health and welfare, marine life, aesthetic, recreation, and eco-
nomic values. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1) (1994).
39. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (1994).
40. Id. § 230.10(a)(3). The presumption applies to discharges into wetlands and
other "special aquatic sites." l
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steps have been taken which will minimize potential adverse impacts
of the discharge on the aquatic ecosystem."' For instance, if it is ap-
propriate and practicable for a developer to treat the materials that
will be discharged into wetlands to reduce their toxicity before dis-
charge, or to use machinery or techniques designed to reduce damage
to surrounding wetlands in the discharge, a § 404 permit should not be
issued unless the developer takes such steps to minimize the impacts
of the discharge.42
The guidelines recognize that one way to minimize the impact of a
proposed discharge of dredged or fill material on wetlands or other
aquatic ecosystems is to restore or construct wetlands in another loca-
tion to replace the wetlands that will be impacted by the discharge,
thus "mitigating" the impacts of the discharge.43 This approach is re-
ferred to as "compensatory mitigation."
Prior to 1989, the Corps and EPA disagreed about the role that
compensatory mitigation played in the review of § 404 permit applica-
tions under the § 404(b)(1) guidelines. Some districts of the Corps
concluded that compensatory mitigation proposals of a permit appli-
cant could be considered during the alternatives analysis to compen-
sate entirely for any adverse impacts of the proposed discharge and,
thus, reduce the impacts of a discharge to zero." Since the discharge
would not have any net adverse impacts on the aquatic ecosystem, the
41. Id. § 230.10(d). The guidelines also provide that a proposed discharge will not
be permitted if it causes or contributes to a violation of a state's water quality stan-
dards, violates applicable toxic effluent standards or prohibitions under § 307 of the
Clean Water Act, jeopardizes the continued existence of endangered or threatened
species under the Endangered Species Act, violates requirements imposed to protect
marine sanctuaries designated under the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuar-
ies Act, or if it "cause[s] or contribute[s] to significant degradation of the waters of
the United States." Id. § 230.10(c).
42. Subpart H of the guidelines includes a non-exhaustive list of examples of ac-
tions that can be taken to minimize the potential adverse impact of a discharge on the
aquatic ecosystem. They are organized according to "actions concerning the location
of the discharge," 40 C.F.R. § 230.70, "actions concerning the material to be dis-
charged," Id. § 230.71, "actions controlling the material after discharge," Id. § 230.72,
"actions affecting the method of dispersion," Id. § 230.73, "actions related to technol-
ogy," Id. § 230.74, "actions affecting plant and animal population," Id. § 230.75, "ac-
tions affecting human use," Id. § 230.76, and "other actions," Id. § 230.77.
43. The guidelines provide that "[m]inimization of adverse effects on populations
of plants and animals can be achieved by ... [u]sing planning and construction prac-
tices to institute habitat development and restoration to produce a new or modified
environmental state of higher ecological value by displacement of some or all of the
existing environmental characteristics. Habitat development and restoration tech-
niques can be used to minimize adverse impacts and to compensate for destroyed
habitat." Id.. § 230.75(d).
The Corps also considers mitigation proposals pursuant to its regulations as part of
the "public interest" review that applies to all permits issued by the Corps. 33 C.F.R.
§ 320.4 (1994).
44. Royal C. Gardner, The Army-EPA Mitigation Agreement: No Retreat From
Wetlands Protection, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,337, 10,339-40 (Aug. 1990).
Those Corps districts interpreted the guidelines to allow a permit applicant to "buy
WETLANDS
permit applicant could easily demonstrate that there were no alterna-
tives to its proposal that would have a less adverse effect on the
aquatic ecosystem.45 Not surprisingly, the EPA interpreted the guide-
lines differently.
The Corps and the EPA resolved their disagreement through a
memorandum of agreement on mitigation that "clarified" the require-
ments of the § 404(b)(1) guidelines and explicitly rejected the Corps'
interpretation of the guidelines.46 In particular, the memorandum
clarified that the guidelines establish a "sequence" of mitigation 47 re-
quirements that proceeds from avoidance to minimization to compen-
sation.48 Pursuant to the guidelines, adverse impacts to wetlands must
be avoided to the extent that practicable alternatives are available
that result in less adverse impacts. 49 The memorandum explicitly pro-
vides that compensatory mitigation proposals will not be considered in
determining the impact of a proposed discharge for purposes of ascer-
taining whether practicable alternatives exist that will have a less ad-
verse impact on the aquatic ecosystem.5° If adverse impacts from a
discharge cannot be avoided, they must be minimized.51 Finally,
"compensatory mitigation" is required for all adverse impacts of the
discharge that cannot be avoided or minimized. 52 "Compensatory
down" the adverse impacts of a proposed discharge through compensatory mitigation.
Id.
45. Id. Under that interpretation of the § 404(b)(1) guidelines, if a proposed dis-
charge would adversely impact 10 acres of wetlands, and the permit applicant agreed
to restore 10 acres of wetlands in another area, the Corps could issue the permit
authorizing the discharge even though it might have been practicable for the permit-
tee to reconfigure its development proposal so that the development would not have
impacted any wetlands. Id.
46. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Environmental Protection Agency
and the Department of the Army Concerning the Determination of Mitigation Under
the Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 55 Fed. Reg. 9210 (1990) [herein-
after MOA]. For useful discussions of the MOA, see Gardner, supra note 44; William
L. Want, The Army-EPA Agreement on Wetlands Mitigation, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10,209 (June 1990); Oliver A. Houck, More Net Loss of Wetlands: The Army-
EPA Memorandum of Agreement on Mitigation Under the § 404 Program, 20 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,212 (June 1990).
The MOA applies to review of standard permits only, and not to general permits,
regional permits, programmatic permits or letters of permission. MOA at 9211 n.1.
47. MOA, supra note 46, at 9211-12. The MOA uses the term "mitigation" to
refer to avoidance of adverse impacts, minimization of adverse impacts, and compen-
sation for adverse impacts. Id. at 9211. "Compensatory mitigation" is merely one
type of mitigation. Id.
48. Id. at 9211-12. Deviations from sequencing are allowed when "EPA and the
Corps agree the proposed discharge is necessary to avoid environmental harm .... or
EPA and the Corps agree that the proposed discharge can reasonably be expected to
result in environmental gain or insignificant environmental losses." Id. at 9212.
49. Id. at 9212.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. Compensatory mitigation will, therefore, ordinarily be a component of any
permitted action. Gardner, supra note 44, at 10,341.
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mitigation" requirements are imposed by the Corps as conditions on
the issuance of a § 404 permit.
Pursuant to the memorandum, the quantity and type of compensa-
tory mitigation required as a condition of a § 404 permit is to be
"based solely on the values and functions of the [wetlands] that will be
impacted" by the discharge that is subject to the permit,53 and the
scope of compensatory mitigation that is required should be appropri-
ate to the scope and degree of those impacts.54 According to the
memorandum, in framing compensatory mitigation requirements, the
Corps "strive[s] to achieve a goal of no overall net loss of values and
functions [of wetlands]."55 By their nature, compensatory mitigation
requirements should replace wetlands functions and values that would
otherwise be lost due to the impacts of a proposed discharge remain-
ing after avoidance and minimization options have been exhausted.56
C. Types of Compensatory Mitigation and Preferences
Compensatory mitigation generally involves either creation of arti-
ficial wetlands, restoration of wetlands 5 7 or enhancement of wet-
lands58 to compensate for the unavoidable, nonminimized adverse
impacts of the discharge of dredged or fill material into wetlands that
53. MOA, supra note 46, at 9211.
54. Id. at 9212. Similarly, the Corps' regulations provide that "all mitigation will
be directly related to the impacts of the proposal, appropriate to the scope and degree
of those impacts, and reasonably enforceable." 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(r)(2) (1994).
55. MOA, supra note 46, at 9211. The memorandum recognizes that the goal of
"no net loss" may not be met in each and every permit action, and stresses that the
goal does not prohibit the issuance of a permit that results in the net loss of wetlands
values and functions. Id
The "no net loss" goal was first announced in 1988 by the Conservation Founda-
tion, and adopted by President Bush. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESTORATION
OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS 262 (1988). The Clinton Administration has adopted an
"interim goal" of no overall net loss of the nation's remaining wetlands, and a "long-
term goal" of increasing the quality and quantity of the nation's wetlands resource
base. See WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF ENVTL. POLICY, CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
PROPOSAL ON PROTECTION OF U.S. WETLANDS § IV. 1, reprinted in Env't. Rep.
(BNA) 793, 794 (Aug. 27, 1993) [hereinafter AGENDA].
56. Mitigation requirements are imposed to ensure that the Clean Water Act's
goal of maintaining and restoring the nation's aquatic resources is met. MOA, supra
note 46, at 9211.
57. Restoration of a wetland refers to construction of a wetland where one for-
merly existed. MARK S. DENNISON & JAMES F. BERRY, WETLANDS: GUIDE TO SCI-
ENCE, LAW AND TECHNOLOGY, 292 (1993).
58. "Enhancement" of wetlands refers to improvement of existing wetlands. Id.
The MOA does not specifically refer to enhancement of wetlands as a separate type
of compensatory mitigation, but it is an acceptable form of compensatory mitigation.
See AGENDA, supra note 55, at 799. "Enhancement" of an existing wetland does not,
however, clearly improve the functional value of a degraded wetland to the degree
that a healthy wetland loses functional value through development, so it is generally
not a preferred method of compensatory mitigation. Le Desma, supra note 25, at 512.
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will be authorized by a § 404 permit. 59 Preservation of existing wet-
lands is rarely accepted as compensatory mitigation.6 °
Of the three most generally accepted types of compensatory mitiga-
tion, restoration is often the preferred method because it has the
greatest likelihood of success. 6 1 Attempts to create artificial wetlands
where none existed previously have generally not fared well.62 For a
variety of reasons, regardless of whether it takes the form of restora-
tion, enhancement, or creation, compensatory mitigation, in general,
rarely provides wetlands functions and values that are equal to those
that are lost as a result of the discharges authorized by § 404
permits.63
59. Gardner, supra note 44, at 10,339. Under some state wetlands programs, a
developer may be allowed to pay a fee to be used for future mitigation projects in lieu
of creating, enhancing, or restoring wetlands themselves. McElfish, supra note 26, at
L-2. After Dolan, it will be more difficult for the government to justify such fees
unless the fees will be applied to a specific project that can be evaluated to determine
whether the fee requirement is roughly proportional to the impacts of the proposed
discharge.
60. The EPA/Corps MOA on mitigation provides that "[slimple purchase or 'pres-
ervation' of existing wetlands resources may in only exceptional circumstances be ac-
cepted as compensatory mitigation." MOA, supra note 46, at 9212. As noted above,
the goal of compensatory mitigation is to replace the values and functions of wetlands
that are degraded by impacts from a discharge that are unavoidable and cannot be
minimized further. Preserving wetlands that are already fully functioning and that
can be protected from development by the Corps under the Clean Water Act does not
replace any values or functions of wetlands that are lost due to a proposed discharge.
The result of trading preservation of wetlands for destruction of wetlands is a net loss
of wetlands values and functions.
61. Id.
62. A 1990 study conducted by the Florida Department of Environmental Regula-
tion concluded that one-third of wetlands creation projects in the state were never
implemented, only 12% of nontidal wetlands creation projects were successful, and
only 45% of tidal wetlands creation projects were successful. FLORIDA DEP'T OF
ENvTL. REGULATION, REPORT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PERMITrED MITIGATION,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (1990).
Similarly, a study conducted by the University of Massachusetts at Amherst's Envi-
ronmental Institute found that "50% of the attempts to create wetlands [reviewed in
the study] ... failed to even grow wetlands vegetation." David Salvesen, Banking on
Wetlands, URBAN LAND, June 1993, at 36, 37.
63. In a 1988 review of mitigation projects in tidelands in the San Francisco Bay
area, the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission determined
that only 43% of wetland mitigation projects created or enhanced "resources that
were comparable to the resources found in similar, natural relatively undisturbed Bay
tidelands." Le Desma, supra note 25, at 517. -
The reasons that compensatory mitigation projects fail include inadequate design of
the project, poor site selection, and failure to implement the mitigation plan that was
required as a condition of the permit that authorized the original discharge into wet-
lands. Salvesen, supra note 62, at 37. Almost all of the failures in the San Francisco
Bay study were attributed to the failure of the mitigation developer to perform the
mitigation requirements included in the permit. Le Desma, supra note 25, at 517.
Certain types of wetlands systems can be replaced or restored more quickly and
easily than others. In a 1992 report on restoration of aquatic ecosystems, the National
Research Council identified riparian wetlands, depressional (isolated) wetlands, agri-
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To ensure that the wetlands that are created, restored, or enhanced
as compensatory mitigation are not destroyed in the future, the Corps
requires the permittee, as a condition of the § 404 permit, to grant a
conservation easement' over the mitigation property to a conserva-
tion organization,65 or to record a restrictive covenant 66 on the mitiga-
cultural wetlands, coastal wetlands, and freshwater wetlands as wetlands systems that
showed the greatest promise for restoration. McEllish, supra note 26, at L-18.
For an interesting discussion on constructing a successful mitigation project, see
Susan D. Bitter & Keith J. Bowers, Wetland Mitigation and Stream Restoration, PUB-
LIC WORKS, Oct. 1993, at 50.
64. An easement is a right of use granted by the owner of property to a third
party. BLACK'S LAW DICrONARY 509 (6th ed. 1990). More specifically, the Uniform
Conservation Easement Act defines a "conservation easement" as a "nonpossessory
interest of a holder in real property imposing limitations or affirmative obligations the
purposes of which include retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values
of real property, assuring its availability for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-
space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhancing air or water quality,
or preserving the historical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of real
property." UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT Acr § 1(1), 12 U.L.A. 70 (West Supp.
1994).
Many federal laws explicitly authorize the government to acquire conservation
easements. See, e.g., Migratory Bird Conservation Act of 1929, 16 U.S.C. §§ 715a,
715d (1988), and the Wetlands Reserve Program created by 16 U.S.C. §§ 3837-3837f
(Supp. V 1993). However, the Clean Water Act is silent regarding the use of conser-
vation easements as a means of enforcing compensatory mitigation requirements
under the Act. State laws, therefore, govern questions such as who can hold a conser-
vation easement and for what duration a conservation easement can be granted. Ide-
ally, a conservation easement would be an easement in perpetuity.
In many states, however, common law rules impose strict limits on conservation
easements. Conservation easements are considered "negative easements" because
they convey a negative restriction on the landowner granting the easement. Karen A.
Jordan, Perpetual Conservation: Accomplishing the Goal Through Preemptive Federal
Easement Programs, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 401, 406-07 (1993). "Negative ease-
ments" were disfavored at common law because they unduly burdened free aliena-
tion. Id. at 407. In recognition of the importance and value of "conservation
easements," and to overturn the common law precedent that limits their use, many
states have enacted statutes that protect "land use restriction easements." Id. at 408
(citing sources listing states that have adopted such statutes). However, these statutes
vary widely from state to state. Id. at 409. These laws may or may not authorize
conservation easements in perpetuity. Id at 405. They may also limit the purposes
for which conservation easement can be granted and the persons to whom conserva-
tion easements can be granted. Id.
65. As of 1990, almost 900 organizations existed that were dedicated to conserving
and protecting land, compared to 53 in 1950. Jordan, supra note 64, at 411. Among
the largest are the Nature Conservancy, the National Trust for Historic Preservation,
the American Farmland Trust, the Trust for Public Land, and the Conservation Fund,
which protect almost seven million acres of land among them. Id.
66. A restrictive covenant is a "[p]rovision in a deed limiting the use of the prop-
erty and prohibiting certain uses." BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 1315 (6th ed. 1990). It
is recorded by the owner of the property with the deed (although it can be recorded
subsequent to the recording of the deed) and runs with the land to limit future uses of
the land.
In the context of wetlands mitigation, the Corps usually requires a permittee to
record a restrictive covenant on the mitigation property, which provides that the
owner will maintain and preserve the property as wetlands. See W. Brooks Stilwell, A
Case Study of the WE. T., Inc. Mitigation Bank, Millhaven Plantation, Screven County,
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tion property, or both. In either case, the owner of the mitigation
property agrees to carry out the actions necessary to create, restore, or
enhance the wetlands on the mitigation property and to preserve the
wetlands after they have been restored, created, or enhanced.67
Although the property owner agrees to limit the uses to which he or
she will put the wetlands on his or her property, he or she retains all
other rights of ownership over the property, including the right to ex-
clude others.68 Conservation easements and restrictive covenants are
far less restrictive than a requirement that the landowner dedicate the
mitigation property to a conservation organization or the government.
The Corps/EPA memorandum on mitigation establishes preferences
for certain types and amounts of mitigation, despite the fact that the
type and amount of compensatory mitigation required as a condition
of a § 404 permit varies from case to case, depending on the extent to
which the permitted discharge adversely affects wetlands.69 First, the
memorandum establishes a preference for compensatory mitigation
occurring adjacent or contiguous to the site of the permitted discharge
("on-site compensatory mitigation"), or at least within the same wa-
tershed.7 ° Second, the memorandum clarifies that the wetlands that
Georgia, in I.C.L.E. IN GEORGIA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PROGRAM MATERIALS at
06-019, 06-046 (1993) [hereinafter WETpermit] (restrictive covenant attached to per-
mit, providing that the "[o]wner hereby covenants that neither it nor its successors,
assigns, agents, employees or servants... shall not [sic] in any way alter the soils or
hydrology of the property by action or actions taken within or without the boundaries
of the Property except as necessary to comply with the terms of the Permit. The
intent of Owner in placing these restrictions upon the use of the Property is that the
Property shall remain a wetland in perpetuity, for the purpose of conservation and the
protection of public health and the environment.").
The Corps normally requires the landowner to grant the Corps the authority to
enforce the provisions of the covenant. Id. at 06-047.
67. The landowner may also be able to claim a charitable tax deduction for conser-
vation easements that are granted in perpetuity and used exclusively for conservation
purposes. I.R.C. § 170(0(3) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(b)(1) (as amended in
1994); see also Stanley Works v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 389 (1986).
68. See WET permit, supra note 66, at 06-047 (restrictive covenant attached to
permit, providing that the "[o]wner, its successors and assigns, shall retain all other
customary rights of ownership, including but not limited to the exclusive possession of
the Property, the right to use the Property in any manner not prohibited by this Cove-
nant, and the right to transfer or assign interest in the Property, subject to the condi-
tions of this covenant."); id. at 06-043 (conservation easement attached to permit,
providing that "[a]lthough this Conservation Easement in gross will benefit the public
in the ways recited above, nothing herein shall be construed to convey a right to the
public or access or use of the property and the Grantor, his heirs and assigns shall
retain exclusive right to such access and use, subject only to the provisions herein
recited.").
As a condition of the conservation easement, the property owner usually grants the
easement holder a limited right of access to the property to ensure that the property
owner is complying with the terms of the easement. However, the right of access is
limited, since easements, by definition, are non-possessory interests in land. RE-
STATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY 450 (1944).
69. MOA, supra note 46, at 9212.
70. Id The memorandum provides that compensatory mitigation
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are being enhanced, restored, or created as compensatory mitigation
should normally be of the same type as the wetlands adversely af-
fected by the permitted discharge ("in kind compensatory mitiga-
tion").7' Finally, the memorandum recommends that at least one acre
of wetlands should be restored, enhanced, or created for every acre of
wetlands adversely affected by the permitted discharge.7z The ratio is
often greater than 1:1 when the compensatory mitigation that will be
provided involves creation of wetlands because it is quite likely that
the mitigation effort will not be completely successful.7 3
should be undertaken, when practicable, in areas adjacent or contiguous to
the discharge site (on-site compensatory mitigation). If on-site compensa-
tory mitigation is not practicable, off-site compensatory mitigation should be
undertaken in the same geographic area if practicable (i.e., in close physical
proximity and, to the extent possible, the same watershed).
Id.
The Corps and EPA prefer on-site mitigation because it is more likely that on-site
mitigation, rather than off-site mitigation, will replace the functions and values that
were provided by the wetlands impacted by the permitted discharge. See McElfish,
supra note 26, at L-14; Salvesen, supra note 62, at 37. For instance, if wetlands ad-
versely affected by a permitted discharge provided habitat support for various animal
species, it is more likely that wetlands that are restored, enhanced, or created adjacent
or contiguous to the destroyed wetlands will provide replacement habitat than off-site
wetlands.
The other practical reason for the preference is that the permittee would have bet-
ter access to the property contiguous or adjacent to the wetlands impacted by the
discharge and be able to undertake mitigation on that property than at an off-site
location. McElfish, supra note 26, at L-14.
71. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service classifies wetlands in five different systems:
(1) marine (deepwater); (2) estuarine (coastal or tidal); (3) riverine (river and stream
channels); (4) lacustrine (deepwater); and (5) palustrine (inland). U.S. FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERV., WETLANDS OF THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT STATUS AND RE-
CENT TRENDS 5 (1984). Estuarine and palustrine wetland systems are the most abun-
dant and include the following types of wetlands: (a) estuarine emergent; (b)
estuarine intertidal fiats; (c) estuarine scrub-shrub; (d) palustrine emergent; (e) palus-
trine scrub-shrub; and (f) palustrine forested. Id. at 511.
"Out-of-kind" compensatory mitigation involves creating, restoring, or enhancing
wetlands of a different type than the wetlands that are adversely impacted by the
discharge that is permitted by a § 404 permit.
72. The memorandum stresses that compensatory mitigation should provide one-
for-one replacement of the "values and functions" adversely affected by the permitted
discharge. However, the memorandum notes that "[iun the absence of more definitive
information on the functions and values of specific wetlands sites, a minimum of 1 to 1
acreage replacement may be used as a reasonable surrogate for no net loss of func-
tions and values." MOA, supra note 46, at 9213.
It recognizes, however, that the replacement ratio may be higher when the func-
tional values of the replacement wetlands are lower than when the values of the wet-
lands affected by the permitted discharge or the likelihood of success of the mitigation
project is low. Id. It also notes that the replacement ratio may be lower than 1:1
when the functional values of the replacement wetlands are higher than the values of
the wetlands affected by their permitted discharge and when the likelihood of success
of the mitigation project is high. Id.
73. The MOA cautions agency personnel that "[t]here is continued uncertainty
regarding the success of wetland creation or other habitat development. Therefore, in
determining the nature and extent of habitat development of this type, careful consid-
eration should be given to its likelihood of success." Id at 9212. The likelihood of
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D. Mitigation Banking
In recent years, the Corps has begun to allow developers to provide
compensatory mitigation for § 404 permits by purchasing compensa-
tory mitigation "credits" from "mitigation banks. '74 Mitigation banks
are created pursuant to a permit from the Corps or through a memo-
randum of agreement between the Corps and the mitigation bank de-
veloper.75 The process begins when the mitigation "banker," which
success of mitigation is a factor that the agency considers in determining the ratio of
compensatory mitigation to wetlands impacted by a permitted discharge. Id. at 9212-
13.
74. Although there is no explicit statutory or regulatory authority for mitigation
banking, the Corps/EPA MOA on mitigation approves mitigation banking as an ac-
ceptable form of compensatory mitigation in some circumstances. Id. at 9212. Specif-
ically, the MOA provides that
[m]itigation banking may be an acceptable form of compensatory mitigation
under specific criteria designed to ensure an environmentally successful
bank. Where a mitigation bank has been approved by EPA and the Corps
for purposes of providing compensatory mitigation for specific identified
projects, use of that mitigation bank for those particular projects is consid-
ered as meeting the objectives of Section II.C.3 of this MOA [compensatory
mitigation], regardless of practicability of other forms of compensatory miti-
gation. Additional guidance on mitigation banking will be provided.
Id.
EPA has provided some further guidance on mitigation banking at the regional
level. See U.S. EPA Region IX, Mitigation Banking Guidance.
The Clinton Administration has also indicated its support for the use of mitigation
baking in "appropriate circumstances." AGENDA, supra note 55, 799.
Several states have adopted statutes that specifically authorize the creation of miti-
gation banks for state wetlands programs. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30233
(West 1986); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 1775-1793 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-85.5-101 to -111 (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.4135
(Supp. 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-214.41 (Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN., NAT.
RES. § 8-1209.1 (Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13.913-13 to -151991 (West 1991 &
Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-32-05 (Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 196.600 to
.665 (1991 & Supp. 3 1994); Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-11-310 to -311 (1994).
75. In some cases, the restoration or creation of wetlands to establish a mitigation
bank will involve a "discharge" into wetlands that is subject to § 404. In those cases,
the mitigation bank will be established through a § 404 permit that authorizes the
discharge. McElfish, supra note 26, at L-25. In other cases, a mitigation bank can be
created when a developer creates or restores more wetlands than are necessary to
serve as compensatory mitigation for a discharge subject to a § 404 permit. In those
cases, the bank will also be established through the § 404 permit. ld. Alternatively,
mitigation banks may be established through a memorandum of agreement. Id.
Guidance from the Corps provides that
.[e]stablishment of each mitigation bank should be accompanied by the de-
velopment of a formal written agreement (e.g., memorandum of agreement)
among the Cops, EPA, other relevant resource agencies, and those parties
who will own, develop, operate, or otherwise participate in the bank. The
purpose of the agreement is to establish clear guidelines for establishment
and use of the mitigation bank. A wetlands mitigation bank may also be
established through issuance of a Section 404 permit where establishing the
proposed bank involves a discharge of dredged or fill material into waters of
the United States.
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, REGULATORY GUIDANCE LETTER 93-2, Guidance
on Flexibility of the 404(b)(1) Guidelines and Mitigation Banking, reprinted in 58 Fed.
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may be a government agency, private corporation, or an individual,
enters into an agreement with the Corps to create or restore wetlands
that the banker owns or intends to purchase.76 The values of the wet-
lands created or restored by the banker are quantified, and the banker
is assigned credits. 77 The banker can then use those credits in the fu-
ture to satisfy mitigation requirements for development projects it un-
dertakes involving discharges into wetlands, or it can sell the credits to
other persons to satisfy mitigation requirements for development
projects that they undertake.78
In accordance with the Corps/EPA memorandum of agreement on
mitigation, there are important limits on the use of mitigation banks
to provide compensatory mitigation for individual section 404 permits.
Since the compensatory mitigation provided by a mitigation bank is
normally "off-site" mitigation, and is often "out-of-kind" mitigation, it
is generally not a preferred form of mitigation. 79 In general, permit-
tees will only be allowed to satisfy compensatory mitigation require-
ments through a mitigation bank when the bank is in the same
watershed as the wetlands being adversely affected by the permitted
discharge.8 °
Reg. 47,719, 47,721-22 (1993) [hereinafter RGL 93-2] (The Corps notes that "RGL's
are used.., as a means to transmit guidance on the permit program (33 C.F.R. parts
320-330) to its division and district engineers. The Corps of Engineers publishes
RGL's in the Federal Register upon issuance as a means of informing the public of
Corps guidance."). Id. at 47,719.
76. Salvesen, supra note 62, at 38.
77. Id
78. Mitigation banks can be established to provide credits for a single user (public
or private) that may undertake several projects that adversely impact wetlands, such
as a state Department of Transportation or a private mall developer. Id.
Mitigation banks can also be established by government or private parties to pro-
vide "credits" to the general public. Id. There are very few private entrepreneurial
mitigation banks in existence today. Id. A 1992 study by the Environmental Law
Institute identified 46 existing mitigation banks and 60 proposed banks. McElfish,
supra note 26, at L-2. Almost 75% of the existing banks were single-user public
banks. Id
79. It is, however, authorized in certain circumstances. Guidance from the Corps
provides that
[t]he agencies' preference for on-site, in-kind compensatory mitigation does
not preclude the use of wetland mitigation banks where it has been deter-
mined by the Corps, or other appropriate permitting agency, in coordination
with the Federal resource agencies through the standard permit evaluation
process, that the use of a particular mitigation bank as compensation for
proposed wetland impacts would be appropriate for offsetting impacts to the
aquatic ecosystem. In making such a determination, careful consideration
must be given to wetland functions, landscape position, and affected species
populations at both the impact and mitigation bank sites.
RGL 93-2, supra note 75, at 47,721.
80. Id See also WET permit, supra note 66, at 06-024 (condition 14 of the permit
limits the use of credits from the bank to "Chatham County, Georgia and the Savan-
nah River basin north to the limits of the Coastal Plain").
The purpose of the limitation is to increase the likelihood that the mitigation will
replace the same functions and values that are impacted by the permitted discharge.
1995] WETLANDS 703
Despite those limits, mitigation banking is becoming more popular
because it provides several environmental and economic benefits.
Mitigation banks may offer greater prospects for successful mitigation
than individual compensatory mitigation projects because mitigation
banks: (1) attempt to create or restore a larger area of wetlands than
individual compensatory mitigation projects,8' (2) are easier to moni-
tor than several smaller individual projects,8 2 and (3) allow the devel-
oper more freedom in choosing sites with hydrology and soils that are
favorable to the restoration or creation of wetlands.83 In addition, in
For instance, restoration of a coastal wetland will probably not produce the same
functions and values that are lost as a result of development of a prairie pothole
wetland.
81. Guidance from the Corps and EPA suggests that "[i]t may be more ecologi-
cally advantageous for maintaining the integrity of the aquatic ecosystem to consoli-
date compensatory mitigation for impacts to many smaller, isolated or fragmented
habitats into a single large parcel or contiguous parcels." RGL 93-2, supra note 75, at
47,721; See also Le Desma, supra note 25, at 503.
Larger wetland systems are usually more self-sustaining than smaller systems, in
that they can provide
habitat for more types of species, a longer and more self-sustaining food
chain, more habitat niches, and a wider variety of habitat types-which, in
turn, can better accommodate ecosystem succession, migration and change
.... They may better protect species from inbreeding effects due to the
isolation of small populations, and may be more resilient to natural disasters
because of their larger size, larger seed banks, and more varied habitat.
McElfish, supra note 26, at L-16.
82. One of the major reasons that many compensatory mitigation projects fail is
because the government lacks the resources and time to adequately monitor the
projects to ensure that the mitigation requirements are being carried out. Salvesen,
supra note 62, at 37; Leonard Shabman et al., Expanding Opportunities for Successful
Wetland Mitigation: The Private Credit Market Alternative: Executive Summary, 1994
A.B.A. SEC. NAT. RES. & ENVTL. L., 9TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON WETLANDS LAW
AND REGULATION J-3.
It is much easier for the government to monitor mitigation at one large site than
several smaller, isolated sites. Salvesen, supra note 62, at 37.
83. McElfish, supra note 26, at L-1. Although the Corps/EPA MOA establishes a
preference for on-site mitigation, in many cases, development at the site of the dis-
charge may make it difficult to create or restore viable wetlands on the site. As one
commentator has noted:
In many cases, developments in wetlands do not leave an ecologically viable
remnant wetland [on-site].... Adjacent impacts from the new development
may degrade what natural wetlands do remain as well as the onsite mitiga-
tion wetland; this is the case with many "patch" wetlands and onsite mitiga-
tion projects surrounded by housing developments or shopping centers.
Indeed, onsite mitigation has a dismal record, as revealed in several studies
conducted for the Florida DER and for EPA.
Id. at L-15.
In addition, the preference for on-site mitigation may lead the Corps to require
creation of wetlands on uplands that are adjacent to the wetlands impacted by the
permitted discharge. Id. Creation of wetlands in uplands is less likely to be successful
than restoration of wetlands or creation of wetlands in areas with appropriate
hydrology.
Another advantage of locating a mitigation bank off-site is that it can be sited in an
area where it can achieve larger ecological goals on an ecosystem basis. Id. at 16.
However, to the extent that it is purposefully sited to create functions and values that
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contrast to individual compensatory mitigation projects, the restora-
tion or creation of wetlands in a mitigation bank can be completed
and functioning before mitigation credits are granted by the bank. 4
Thus, the use of mitigation banks can prevent any temporal loss of
values and functions of wetlands caused by a permitted discharge.85
Mitigation banks also provide economic benefits for developers, in
that economies of scale provided by the bank usually result in lower
costs for mitigation obtained from the bank than for individual mitiga-
tion projects.86
On the other hand, mitigation banking may encourage more devel-
opment in wetlands by making it easier to satisfy compensatory miti-
gation requirements.' Furthermore, while mitigation banks may
create or restore wetlands that provide a variety of functions and val-
ues, those functions and values may be different from the functions
and values impacted by permitted discharges into wetlands.88
are different than those impacted by the development for which the bank will be
providing compensation, it may be less defensible under the Dolan test described
infra.
Moreover, in many instances, a mitigation bank will be more likely to succeed than
individual compensatory mitigation projects because the mitigation bank developer
has expertise in managing and monitoring the mitigation that the individual compen-
satory mitigation manager lacks. Salvesen, supra note 62, at 37; see also RGL 93-2,
supra note 75, at 47,721.
84. However, the Corps can authorize a mitigation bank to issue credits from the
bank before the mitigation project is successfully completed. RGL 93-2, supra note
75, at 47,721. This is important because the average maturation period for a successful
mitigation project ranges from eight to ten years. Le Desma, supra note 25, at 515.
When the Corps authorizes the issuance of credits from a mitigation bank before the
mitigation has been successfully completed, the Corps may adjust the value of the
credits to reflect the fact that the mitigation has not been successfully completed. Id.
For instance, instead of allowing a § 404 permittee whose discharge impacts 10 acres
of wetlands to satisfy the compensatory mitigation requirements for its permit by
purchasing credits for 10 acres of wetlands from the mitigation bank, the Corps may
require the permittee to purchase credits for 20 acres.
The developer of a mitigation bank will often want to issue credits before the wet-
lands restoration or creation undertaken by the mitigation bank is successfully com-
pleted to distribute the costs and risks of establishing the bank to a greater number of
parties. Shabman, supra note 82, at J-4.
85. RGL 93-2, supra note 75, at 47,721; Le Desma, supra note 25, at 503. In short,
the Corps can be assured that the values and functions destroyed by a permitted activ-
ity will be replaced by mitigation because the mitigation has already been completed.
86. Le Desma, supra note 25, at 508; Salvesen, supra note 62, at 39. RGL 93-2
provides that "[d]evelopment of a wetland mitigation bank can bring together finan-
cial resources and planning and scientilic expertise not practicable to many individual
mitigation proposals." See RGL 93-2, supra note 75, at 47,721.
87. In light of the statistics regarding the failure rate of compensatory mitigation
projects, the Corps should tread gently when taking actions that encourage develop-
ers to trade flourishing wetland ecosystems for future restoration or creation of
wetlands.
88. However, even in the context of mitigation banking, the goal of the Corps in
imposing a "compensatory mitigation" requirement as a condition in a § 404 permit is
to replace the functions and values of wetlands that are adversely affected by the
permitted discharge after all appropriate and practicable steps to avoid or minimize
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As is evident from the aforementioned description of compensatory
mitigation, when the Corps, as a condition of a § 404 permit, requires
a landowner to undertake an individual compensatory mitigation pro-
ject on its property, the condition limits the uses to which the land-
owner can put his or her property. The remainder of this Article
explores the "takings" implications of individual compensatory miti-
gation conditions in § 404 permits, and of conditions that authorize a
landowner to satisfy mitigation requirements by purchasing credits
from a mitigation bank.
II. THE TRADITIONAL REGULATORY TAKINGS ANALYSIS
Almost three-quarters of a century ago, the Supreme Court held
that, in certain extreme circumstances, government regulation could
constitute a taking of private property requiring just compensation
under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.89 Since then, the
Court has clarified that government regulation can constitute a taking
in either of two situations: (1) the regulation does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests;' or (2) the regulation deprives a
the impacts have been taken. See supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text. Thus,
before the Corps authorizes a permittee to satisfy the compensatory mitigation re-
quirements of its permit through purchase of credits from a mitigation bank, the
Corps should ensure that the wetlands created or restored by the mitigation bank
replace the values and functions that are adversely affected by the permitted
discharge.
89. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922).
90. In determining whether government regulation "substantially advances a legit-
imate state interest," courts balance the government's interests and public interest
against the landowner's interest to determine whether the regulation forces the land-
owner to bear a burden that the public, as a whole, should bear. Keystone Bitumi-
nous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255, 261 (1980); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
To make that determination, the court examines all of the benefits that the land-
owner receives from the regulation and the impacts of the landowner's actions on the
public as well as the burdens that the regulation places on the landowner. For in-
stance, in reviewing the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance in Agins, the court
held that
[t]here is no indication that the appellants' five-acre tract is the only prop-
erty affected by the ordinances. Appellants therefore will share with other
owners the benefits and burdens of the city's exercise of its police power. In
assessing the fairness of the zoning ordinances, these benefits must be con-
sidered along with any diminution in market value that the appellants might
suffer.
447 U.S. at 262.
Similarly, in reviewing legislation that limited the amount of coal that the challeng-
ers in Keystone could mine from their property, the Court held that
[t]he Court's hesitance to find a taking when the State merely restrains uses
of property that are tantamount to public nuisances is consistent with the
notion of 'reciprocity of advantage' that Justice Holmes referred to in Penn-
sylvania Coal. Under our system of government, one of the State's primary
ways of preserving the public weal is restricting the uses individuals can
make of their property. While each of us is burdened somewhat by such
1995]
706 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VI
landowner of all economically viable use of his or her property.9'
Essentially, most recent Supreme Court regulatory takings deci-
sions have attempted to clarify either how to determine when a regu-
lation deprives property of all economically viable use9 2 or whether a
regulation depriving property of all economically viable use effects a
taking, regardless of whether it substantially advances legitimate state
interests.93 However, Dolan v. City of Tigard94 and its predecessor,
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,95 focused on the "legitimate
state interests" prong of the Agins test. Specifically, Dolan and Nol-
lan focused on how to determine whether a requirement that a land-
owner dedicate a portion of his or her property to the government, as
a condition for a permit to develop his or her property, substantially
advances a legitimate state interest.96
In cases in which the government has not required landowners to
dedicate part of their property as a condition for obtaining a permit to
develop the rest, the "legitimate state interests" requirement of the
Agins test has not imposed much of a limit on the government's regu-
latory authority.
Traditionally, the Court has placed the burden on the claimant chal-
lenging the governmental regulation to demonstrate that the regula-
tion does not substantially advance legitimate state interests.97 The
restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions that are placed
on others.
480 U.S. at 491.
91. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980). In addition, when government
regulation compels landowners to suffer permanent physical invasions of their prop-
erty, the Court has generally held that the regulation constitutes a taking, regardless
of its purpose. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419 (1982).
92. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Andrus v. Allard, 444
U.S. 51 (1979); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
93. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). Similarly,
under the Agins test, a regulation that does not substantially advance a legitimate
state interest can effect a taking regardless of whether it deprives a landowner of all
economically viable use of its property. 447 U.S. at 260-61 (1980). However, as the
U.S. Claims Court recognized in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct.
381, 390 (1988), aff'd, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994), prior to Dolan v. City of Tigard,
114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), there were no reported decisions in which federal courts held
that a regulation constituted a taking solely because it failed to substantially advance
a legitimate state interest, without also finding that the regulation deprived the land-
owner of all economically viable use of their property.
94. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). The Dolan Court explicitly noted that the dedication
requirement at issue did not deprive the landowner of all economically viable use of
her property. Id. at 2316 n.6.
95. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
96. See infra notes 104-49 and accompanying text.
97. United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 60 (1989); Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590, 594-596 (1962); Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). In Goldblatt, for
instance, the Court noted that there is a presumption that the government acts consti-
tutionally when acting pursuant to its police power, 369 U.S. at 594, and held that
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challenger can meet that burden either by showing that there is not a
legitimate state interest for the regulation or by showing that the regu-
lation does not "substantially advance" that interest.
In practice, however, the judiciary has often been deferential to
governmental entities facing regulatory takings claims. One must be
cognizant that the Court has upheld a broad range of governmental
purposes as "legitimate state interests." 98 In addition, when the gov-
ernment is acting pursuant to its police power to prevent a nuisance,
courts generally find that as long as the government's actions are ra-
tionally related to the legitimate police power objective, the govern-
ment's actions "substantially advance legitimate state objectives"
under the Agins test. 9
"[o]ur past cases leave no doubt that [the challengers] had the burden on 'reasonable-
ness.'" Id. at 596.
Prior to Dolan, there were no reported cases in which the Court imposed a burden
on the government to justify its actions as constitutional in the face of a takings
challenge.
See infra notes 165-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether the pre-
sumption discussed in Goldblatt only applies to challenges to legislative actions by the
government.
98. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-35.
99. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (township's prohibition
on mining and excavation on the petitioner's property upheld as reasonably necessary
to achieve a legitimate objective); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (gov-
ernment prohibition on the operation of a brickyard on the petitioner's property up-
held as reasonably related to a legitimate government objective).
The rational relationship test used by the Court in those cases is not a difficult test
to satisfy. As the Court stressed in Keystone, courts are not supposed to "undertake
'least restrictive alternative' analysis in deciding whether a state regulatory scheme is
designed to remedy a public harm or is instead intended to provide private benefits.
That a land use regulation may be somewhat overinclusive or underinclusive is, of
course, no justification for rejecting it." 480 U.S. at 487 n.16.
The analysis that the Court used in those cases and in similar cases involving gov-
ernment regulation to prevent a nuisance arguably still has vitality despite the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112
S.Ct. 2886 (1992). Lucas merely held that a regulation that deprives property of all
economically viable use effects a taking even though the regulation may have been
enacted to prevent a nuisance or though the regulation otherwise "substantially ad-
vances a legitimate state objective." Id. at 2893-94. Lucas did not hold that the analy-
sis used by the Hadacheck and Goldblatt courts was inappropriate to determine
whether government regulation "substantially advanced legitimate state interests."
On the contrary, the Lucas Court held that the analysis used in cases such as
Hadacheck and Goldblatt was "the progenitor of our more contemporary statements
that 'land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it "substantially advance[s] legiti-
mate state interests.. ..." Id. at 2897.
At one point, the Lucas Court noted that the distinction between regulation that
prevents harmful use and regulation that confers benefits is difficult, if not impossible,
to discern on an objective-free basis, and that "noxious use logic cannot serve as a
touchstone to distinguish regulatory takings... from regulatory deprivations that do
not require compensation." Id. at 2899. However, in that passage, the Lucas Court
was merely explaining why, as a practical matter, the Court could not authorize a
"nuisance exception" to the categorical rule that a regulation that deprives property
of all economically beneficial use effects a taking, without creating an exception that
would swallow up the rule. The Lucas Court was not holding that such an analysis
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Under the traditional analysis, to successfully challenge compensa-
tory mitigation conditions'00 in a § 404 permit as a taking, a permittee
would have the burden of demonstrating that the mitigation require-
ment did not substantially advance a legitimate state objective. 101
That burden could be difficult for the claimant to overcome because:
(1) the Corps has a legitimate interest in requiring compensatory miti-
gation as a condition of a § 404 permit to preserve and enhance water
quality, 0 2 and (2) the Corps imposes the mitigation requirements to
prevent the nuisance that would be caused by destruction of the wet-
lands if a § 404 permit were granted.' 03 To prevail, the claimant would
have to demonstrate that the Corps' mitigation requirements were not
rationally related to its legitimate objectives.
III. NOLLAN AND DOLAN
However, the Supreme Court modified the "legitimate state inter-
ests" analysis in two recent cases in which government entities re-
quired landowners to dedicate a portion of their property to the
government as a condition of a permit to develop the property. In
would be inappropriate in situations in which regulation has not deprived property of
all economically viable use.
Specifically, the Court noted:
A fortiori the legislature's recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be
the basis for departing from our categorical rule that total regulatory takings
must be compensated. If it were, departure would virtually always be al-
lowed.... Our cases provide no support for this: None of them that em-
ployed the logic of 'harmful use' prevention to sustain a regulation involved
an allegation that the regulation wholly eliminated the value of the claim-
ant's land.
Id.
100. The analysis discussed in the text applies to challenges to conditions requiring
individual compensatory mitigation projects or conditions authorizing mitigation
banking as compensatory mitigation.
101. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
102. The Clean Water Act establishes a comprehensive program to maintain and
enhance the physical, chemical or biological integrity of the nation's waters. 33
U.S.C. § 1251. Many lower court decisions have held that the denial of a § 404 permit
promotes a valid public interest in protecting and enhancing water quality. See, e.g.,
Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 904 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1053 (1987); Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332, 334 (1992); Lovela-
dies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 388 (1988), aff'd, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed.
Cir. 1994). Mitigation conditions serve the same valid purpose as permit denial.
103. If the Corps has imposed compensatory mitigation conditions in a permit, the
Corps has determined that the permitted discharge would destroy valuable wetlands
functions, such as flood prevention, erosion prevention, or habitat support. See supra
notes 44-56 and accompanying text. The conditions are imposed to prevent the nui-
sance that is caused by destruction of those functions.
In determining whether the Corps is imposing burdens on the developer that the
public as a whole should bear, a court is likely to weigh very heavily the fact that the
Corps would not impose any burden on the developer if the developer were not de-
stroying wetlands that provide benefits not only for the developer, but for the general
public as well. In addition, the court will consider the benefits that the developer will
directly receive as a result of the mitigation requirements.
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Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,' the Supreme Court held
that when the government requires a landowner to dedicate a portion
of his or her property to the government as a condition of a develop-
ment permit, there must be an "essential nexus" between the dedica-
tion requirement and the legitimate objective for the requirement. 10 5
Subsequently, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, °6 the Court went further
and held that, in such cases, the burden is on the government to
demonstrate that the dedication requirement is "roughly propor-
tional" to the nature and extent of the impacts of the development
subject to the permit. 0 7
Nevertheless, it is not clear how broadly Nollan and Dolan should
be read. Is the Dolan application of the "legitimate state interests"
test limited to situations in which the government requires a land-
owner to dedicate property to the government as a condition of a de-
velopment permit?"°8 Does the Dolan analysis apply more broadly to
any condition in a permit?10 9 If Dolan applies to all permit condi-
tions, what impact, if any, will this have on the Corps' ability to im-
pose compensatory mitigation requirements as conditions of § 404
permits?
A. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
The Supreme Court made its first significant modification of the
traditional "legitimate state interests" test in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission."0 In 1982, James and Marilyn Nollan applied to
the California Coastal Commission ("Commission") for a permit to
demolish a bungalow on their oceanfront property and to replace it
with a three-bedroom house."' The Commission granted the Nollans'
permit application on the condition that they grant an easement that
would allow the public to pass across their property to access the adja-
cent public beach." 2 The Nollans challenged the imposition of the
permit condition as an unconstitutional taking of their property." 3
104. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
105. Id. at 837.
106. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
107. Id at 2319-20.
108. It is also possible that the analysis is limited to the imposition of permit condi-
tions that require landowners to dedicate property interests, such as easements, to the
government when the dedication extinguishes the landowners right to exclude the
public from the property.
109. It is unlikely that Nollan and Dolan apply outside the arena of permit condi-
tions to fundamentally change the nature of the "substantially advances legitimate
state interests" test by imposing the burden on the government in all cases to justify
its action against takings challenges. Even under its broadest reading, Dolan would
probably be limited to takings challenges to government decisions made through ad-
judication. See infra notes 166-73 and accompanying text.
110. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
111. Id. at 828.
112. Id
113. Id. at 829.
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Since the Nollans did not claim that the permit condition deprived
their property of all economically viable use, the constitutional ques-
tion that the Supreme Court had to resolve was whether the permit
condition "substantially advance[d a] legitimate state interest[ ].,114
The Nollan Court assumed that the purposes for the access condi-
tion, "protecting the public's ability to see the beach, assisting the
public in overcoming the 'psychological barrier' to using the beach
created by a developed shorefront, and preventing congestion of pub-
lic beaches," were legitimate state interests, and noted that "unques-
tionably," the Commission could have denied the Nollans' permit
application outright if their development proposal would have "sub-
stantially impede[d]" those purposes." 5 If the Commission's denial of
the Nollans' permit application would not constitute a taking of their
property, the Court reasoned, issuance of the permit with conditions
designed to serve the same objectives as permit denial should not con-
stitute a taking either. 1 6 More specifically, the Court held that the
dedication requirement imposed by the Commission could be upheld
against a taking challenge if there was an "essential nexus" between
the condition and the legitimate state interests for the condition."1
7
However, the Court did not explain the degree of relationship be-
tween the dedication requirement and the purposes for the require-
ment that would constitute an "essential nexus.""' 8
B. Dolan v. City of Tigard
This past term, the Supreme Court clarified the requirements of the
"essential nexus" test in Dolan v. City of Tigard.119 Florence Dolan
owned a retail electric and plumbing supply store in the central busi-
ness district ("CBD") of the City of Tigard, Oregon adjacent to Fanno
114. Id at 834 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
115. Id. at 835-36.
116. Id. at 836. The Court held that "[i]f a prohibition designed to accomplish [a
legitimate state objective] would be a legitimate exercise of the police power rather
than a taking, it would be strange to conclude that providing the owner an alternative
to that prohibition which accomplishes the same purpose is not." Id. at 836-37.
In fact, the Court held that it would even be appropriate for the government to
impose a condition on a permit that would constitute a per se taking if the condition
were imposed outside of the context of the permit, as long as the condition was suffi-
ciently related to the legitimate state objectives for the condition. Id.
117. Id. at 837. As the Court held, "unless the permit condition serves the same
governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid
regulation of land use but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion.'" Id.
118. The Commission argued that the condition could be upheld as long as it was
"reasonably related" to the purposes for the condition. Id. at 838. Although the
Court did not adopt the "reasonably related" test, it held, for purposes of argument,
that the dedication requirement imposed by the Commission would be unconstitu-
tional even under that test, since it was not reasonably related to the purposes for the
condition. Id. at 838-39.
119. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
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Creek. 2 ° In 1991, Dolan applied to the City Planning Commission for
a permit to double the size of her store, pave her gravel parking lot,
and build another structure on the property for additional
businesses.' 2 1
The Community Development Code ("CDC"), a comprehensive
land-use plan enacted by the City to comply with State law,' 22 im-
posed several limits on further development in Tigard's congested
CBD.123 Pursuant to the CDC, new development in the CBD must
facilitate a plan that the City adopted for a pedestrian/bicycle pathway
by dedicating land to the City for pathways where provided for in the
plan.'24 The CDC also provided that when development is allowed
within or adjacent to the 100-year floodplain, "the City shall require
the dedication of sufficient open land area for greenway adjoining and
within the floodplain.' 1 25 The greenway dedication requirement was
adopted after the City adopted a Master Drainage Plan, which con-
cluded that flooding occurred in several areas along Fanno Creek, and
that development in the CBD would increase impervious surfaces and
exacerbate the flooding problems.126
In accordance with CDC requirements, the City Planning Commis-
sion granted Dolan her redevelopment permit subject to two condi-
tions. First, Dolan was required to dedicate the portion of her
property located in the floodplain to the City as greenway for im-
provement of a storm drainage system along Fanno Creek. Secondly,
she had to dedicate a fifteen-foot strip of land adjacent to the flood-
plain to the City for the pedestrian/bicycle path.'27 The Commission
made factual findings that, without these conditions, the proposed re-
development could increase flooding in the Fanno Creek drainage ba-
sin and would increase traffic congestion in the CBD. 28
120. Id at 2313.
121. Id. at 2313-14.
122. ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 197.005-197.860 (1991).
123. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2313.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2314.
126. Id. at 2313.
127. Id. at 2314.
128. Id. at 2314-15. In support of the greenway dedication requirement, the Com-
mission found that Fanno Creek and its drainage basin were already strained by storm
water flows and that the anticipated increase that would be caused by the redevelop-
ment could "only add to the public need to manage the stream channel and floodplain
for drainage purposes." Id. at 2315.
In support of the pedestrian/bicycle pathway dedication requirement, the Commis-
sion found that the site plan for the redevelopment provided for a bicycle rack in
front of the proposed building and concluded that it was "reasonable to expect that
some of the users of the bicycle parking provided for by the site plan will use the
pathway." Id. In addition, the Commission determined that creation of the bike path
"could offset some of the traffic demand on [nearby] streets and lessen the increase in
traffic congestion." Id.
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Dolan appealed the permit conditions to the Land Use Board of
Appeals ("Board") on the ground that the conditions constituted a
taking of her property. 129 Based on the Commission's factual findings,
the Board determined that the greenway dedication and pedestrian/
bicycle pathway dedication permit conditions were "reasonably re-
lated" to the City's legitimate objectives for imposing the condi-
tions.130 Dolan appealed the Board's findings to the Oregon Court of
Appeals,' 3 the Oregon Supreme Court, 32 and the United States
Supreme Court.
Initially, the United States Supreme Court determined that if the
Commission had simply required Dolan to dedicate a portion of her
property to the City, rather than conditioning Dolan's redevelopment
permit on the dedication, the dedication requirement would have con-
stituted a taking "without question."'1 33 The question presented to the
Court, therefore, was whether (and under what circumstances) a land-
use restriction that, by itself, constitutes a taking is constitutional
when it is imposed as a condition for a development permit.
The Court recognized that it had consistently held, in a line of cases
including Agins v. Tiburon"M and Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,135
that land-use regulation will not constitute a taking if it substantially
advances legitimate state interests and does not deny a landowner ec-
onomically viable use of his or her land.136 However, the Court distin-
guished Dolan from the Agins and Pennsylvania Coal line of cases by
noting that (1) the government actions challenged in those cases in-
volved legislative determinations as opposed to the adjudicative deter-
mination at issue in Dolan, and (2) the government actions challenged
in the prior cases were mere limitations on the use of landowners'
property, as opposed to the dedication requirement in Dolan.137 , The
Court suggested that the analysis that applied in the case at bar de-
129. Id. at 2315.
130. The City Planning Commission, and the state administrative and judicial tribu-
nals that reviewed the Commission's decision, assumed that Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), held that permit conditions that are "reason-
ably related" to legitimate state objectives that would justify a permit denial satisfy
the "essential nexus" requirement of Nollan and therefore, do not constitute a taking
because they "substantially advance legitimate state interests." Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at
2315-16.
131. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 832 P.2d 853 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).
132. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437 (Or. 1993).
133. 114 S. Ct. at 2316. The Court held that "such public access would deprive
petitioner of the right to exclude others, 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle
of rights that are commonly characterized as property.'" Id (citing Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
134. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
135. 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
136. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316. As previously noted, Dolan did not claim that the
dedication requirement deprived her property of all economically viable use. Id. at
2316 n.6.
137. Id.
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rived not only from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments but from
the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," which provides that
"the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional
right... in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the gov-
ernment where the property sought has little or no relationship to the
benefit."' 38
In Part III of the Dolan opinion, the Court established a two-part
test, based on Nollan, to determine whether the permit condition that
imposed the dedication requirement "substantially advanced legiti-
mate state interests." Under the test, the Court examines whether
there is an "essential nexus" between the legitimate state interest for
the permit condition and the permit condition itself.139 If the Court
determines that there is an essential nexus, the Court must then ascer-
tain whether the nature and extent of the permit condition are
"roughly proportional" to the impacts 40 of the proposed development
authorized by the permit. 14  Although the "rough proportionality"
test is essentially a reasonable relationship test,'142 it differs signifi-
cantly from the analysis that the Court has traditionally used to deter-
mine whether government regulation "substantially advances
138. Id. at 2316-17.
139. Id. at 2317.
140. The "impacts" of the proposed development presumably refers to the impacts
of the development on the government's ability to achieve the legitimate purposes
that are the basis for the condition.
141. The Court noted that it did not have to define the required degree of connec-
tion between the permit condition and the impacts of the proposed development in
Nollan because the permit condition in that case would not have been sufficiently
related to the impacts of the proposed development even under the loosest standard
suggested to the Court. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317.
However, the Dolan Court held that the posture of the case at bar required the
Court to determine what degree of relationship between the permit condition and the
impacts of the proposed development was necessary to pass constitutional muster. Id.
at 2318. The court reviewed a variety of standards used by different state courts, and
concluded that a "rough proportionality" test was the appropriate test. Id. at 2318-19.
In'dissent, Justice Souter quite accurately noted that, under Nollan, the Dolan
Court should have been asking the questions that it was asking in the second part of
the Dolan test in the first part to determine whether there was an "essential nexus"
between the permit conditions and the legitimate purpose for the conditions. Id. at
2330. Nollan suggested that the degree of relationship between the permit condition
and the impacts of the proposed development was relevant to the determination of
whether there was an essential nexus between the permit condition and the legitimate
state objectives for the permit condition. 483 U.S. at 837. Therefore, if the Dolan
court was answering the question that it claimed the Nollan court left unresolved, it
should have answered it in the context in which it was raised in Nollan and held that
there is an "essential nexus" between a permit condition and the impacts of a pro-
posed development when the nature and extent of the permit condition are roughly
proportional to the impacts of the development.
142. 114 S. Ct. at 2319. The Court used the term "rough proportionality" to avoid
confusion with the "rational basis" test used by federal courts in equal protection
analysis. Id. Without the burden shift, therefore, Dolan would not represent a very
significant shift from the traditional "substantially advances legitimate state interests"
test.
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legitimate state interests," because the Dolan Court imposed the bur-
den on the government to demonstrate that the "rough proportional-
ity" test has been met. 143 The Court stressed that "[n]o precise
mathematical calculation is required, but the [government] must make
some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication
is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development." 144
Applying the first part of the analysis, the Dolan Court determined
that there was an essential nexus between the imposition of limits on
development in the 100-year floodplain and the City's legitimate goal
of preventing flooding along Fanno Creek.145 The Court also held
that there was an essential nexus between the provision of a pedes-
trian/bicycle path in the CBD and the City's legitimate goal of reduc-
ing traffic congestion in the CBD.' 46 However, in considering the
second part of the analysis, the Court determined that the City failed
to make an individualized "rough proportionality" determination to
support either the greenway or the bicycle path dedication require-
ments.147 In particular, the Court held that the City failed to make
any individualized determination that dedication of the land in the
floodplain for the greenway, as opposed to some less intrusive restric-
tion on the use of that property, was reasonably related to the City's
goal of flood prevention in Fanno Creek.' 48 Likewise, the Court con-
cluded that the City failed to make any determination that the bike
143. 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20. Justice Souter noted that the majority's holding con-
flicted with the traditional presumption of constitutionality that the court applied
when reviewing government actions pursuant to the police power. Id. at 2331 n.*
(Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, acknowledged that "in
evaluating most generally applicable zoning regulations, the burden properly rests on
the party challenging the regulation to prove that it constitutes an arbitrary regulation
of property rights." Id. at 2320 n.8. However, Justice Rehnquist argued that the pre-
sumption should not apply to the case at bar because it involved a challenge to a
decision made through adjudication, as opposed to a legislative decision. Id. Even if
the majority were correct in holding that a different rule applies to review of adjudica-
tive determinations than to legislative determinations, Justice Souter pointed out that
the permit conditions at issue in Dolan were imposed pursuant to a legislative act-
the City of Tigard Community Development Code. Id. at 2331 n.* (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
144. 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20.
145. Id. at 2318. The Court recognized that Dolan's plans to double the size of her
business and to pave a gravel parking lot would expand the impervious surface on the
property and increase the amount of stormwater runoff into Fanno Creek. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2320-22.
148. Id. at 2320. The Court intimated that a restriction on Dolan's ability to de-
velop the property in the floodplain would have been a reasonable way to prevent
flooding of Fanno Creek that might be caused by the impacts of Dolan's proposed
redevelopment. Id. However, the City went beyond limiting Dolan's ability to de-
velop their property in the floodplain, and required them to dedicate the property as a
public greenway. The Court was troubled by that, noting that "[tlhe city has never
said why a public greenway, as opposed to a private one, was required in the interest
of flood control." Id.
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path dedication requirement was reasonably related to the City's goal
of reducing traffic congestion in the CBD.149
IV. REIGNING IN DOLAN
Unquestionably, the most significant modification that Dolan made
to the traditional "legitimate state interests" analysis was to shift the
claimant's burden to rebut a presumption of constitutionality for gov-
ernment regulatory actions taken pursuant to police power, to the
government to make an individualized determination that the nature
and extent of a permit condition is "roughly proportional" to the im-
pacts of the development authorized by the permit.15°
One may argue, however, that the Dolan analysis only applies to
permit conditions imposing dedication requirements on landowners
that extinguish the landowners' right to exclude others, not to less re-
strictive permit conditions, such as those involving nonpossessory con-
servation easements or restrictive covenants.' Similarly, it can be
argued that the Dolan analysis only applies to review of permit condi-
tions that are formulated through adjudication, not to permit condi-
tions required by legislative action. 52
A. Limiting Dolan to Permit Conditions Involving Dedications
There are several justifications for limiting Dolan to review of per-
mit conditions involving dedications of property that extinguish a
landowner's right to exclude others. The Dolan Court explicitly held
that one of the major reasons that it was departing from the tradi-
tional Agins analysis was because the case at bar involved a require-
The Court did not rule out the possibility that a greenway dedication requirement
could be constitutional in some circumstances, though. For instance, the Court stated
that "[i]f petitioner's- proposed development had somehow encroached on existing
greenway space in the city, it would have been reasonable to require petitioner to
provide some alternative greenway space for the public either on her property or
elsewhere." Id. at 2321.
149. The Court accepted the Commission's findings that the redevelopment would
increase traffic on the streets of the CBD. 114 S. Ct. at 2321. However, since the
Commission found that the proposed bike path could offset some of the additional
traffic demand, instead of finding that the bicycle path would offset some of that de-
mand, the Court held that the Commission failed to make an individualized determi-
nation that the dedication requirement was reasonably related to the impacts of
Dolan's redevelopment. Id. at 2321-22.
150. Apart from the burden shift, the "reasonable relationship" test that is the basis
of the "rough proportionality" test is functionally the same as the reasonableness test
traditionally used by the Court to determine whether government regulation "sub-
stantially advanced" a legitimate state interest.
151. While a permit condition could, in some instances, require dedication of a con-
servation easement, the dedication requirement would only minimally affect the land-
owners' right to exclude others.
In the absence of the Dolan analysis, the traditional "substantially advances legiti-
mate state interests" test, see supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text, would apply.
. 152. Legislative action refers to legislation or legislative rulemaking by an agency.
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ment that a landowner dedicate property to the government.15 3
Significantly, because the Court assumed that if the government "sim-
ply required petitioner to dedicate a strip of land... for public use,
rather than conditioning the grant of her permit to redevelop her
property on such a dedication," it would have constituted a taking per
se because it would have completely deprived the petitioner of her
right to exclude others from the property.154 The right to exclude
others, the Court explained, is "one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.' 5 5
Thus, the Dolan Court did not endeavor to determine whether gov-
ernment regulation, in general, "substantially advance[s] legitimate
state interests," in accordance with Agins.156 Instead, the Court fo-
cused on whether government regulation that would otherwise consti-
tute an unconstitutional taking is rendered constitutional when it is
imposed as a permit condition in exchange for a right to develop prop-
erty. Where the government imposes a permit condition on a land-
owner that would constitute a per se taking outside of the permit
process, the Dolan Court's more stringent test for justification against
a takings challenge may be appropriate. When the permit condition
would not constitute a taking by itself, however, the government
should not be held to a more stringent standard.
153. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316. The other reason, explored in the next section of
this article, was because the case involved a permit condition imposed through adjudi-
cation, rather than a challenge to a legislative act. Id.
154. Id. at 2316-17. The Court has traditionally held government regulatory action
that results in a "permanent physical occupation" of property constitutes a taking per
se, regardless of the purpose for the requirement. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhat-
tan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
In Nollan, the Court held that the requirement that a landowner dedicate an ease-
ment of permanent access across their property to the public constituted a "perma-
nent physical occupation" of property, for purposes of the per se rule of Loretto.
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831-32.
The greenway and bicycle path dedication requirements in Dolan resulted in a
"permanent physical occupation" of the landowners' property even more clearly than
in Nollan.
Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Dolan, is troubled by the Court's focus on the
effect of the permit condition on the landowners' "right to exclude others," rather
than on its effect on the whole parcel of land. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2324. At first
blush, cases such as Nollan, Dolan, and Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164
(1979), seem to depart from the traditional "parcel as a whole" analysis that the Court
uses to define the relevant property interest for takings challenges, see Stephen M.
Johnson, Defining the Property Interest. A Vital Issue in Takings Analysis after Lucas,
14 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 41 (1994), in that they seem to suggest
that the "right to exclude others" is a separate property interest that is subject to a
taking claim. However, upon closer reading, it is evident that, in each of those cases,
the Court did not treat the "right to exclude others" as a separate property interest.
Instead, the Court merely held that the impact of government regulation on the land-
owners' right to exclude others in those cases was dispositive in determining whether
the challenged government regulation effected a taking of the "parcel as a whole" at
issue in each case. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80.
155. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316 (quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176).
156. Id.
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Similarly, to the extent that the Dolan Court shifted the burden to
the government to justify regulatory action as constitutional because
of the "doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,"' 57 the burden shift
should only apply in cases where the government is requiring a land-
owner to surrender a constitutional right in exchange for a discretion-
ary benefit.' 58 If the government includes conditions in a permit that
do not constitute per se takings, the government is not requiring the
landowner to surrender a constitutional right to compensation for a
taking in exchange for the permit; therefore, the Dolan burden shift
should not apply.
Further evidence that the burden shift in Dolan should be limited to
cases involving dedication requirements that extinguish a landowner's
right to exclude others from his or her property can be found by ex-
amining the cases that the Court reviewed in determining that a
"rough proportionality" test was appropriate. 159 Each of the cases
cited by the Court in Dolan involved state or local laws that imposed a
dedication requirement on landowners. 60
Since the Dolan burden shift is limited to cases involving permit
conditions that require landowners to dedicate property interests to
the government and deprive them of their right to exclude others, the
burden shift will not apply to most cases involving compensatory miti-
157. According to the doctrine, the government may not require a person to give
up a constitutional right in exchange for a discretionary benefit when the property
sought has little or no relationship to the benefit. Id. at 2317.
158. One can argue, however, that the burden shift imposed by the court is not
mandated by the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, and, therefore, that the bur-
den shift should not be limited to cases when the doctrine would apply.
159. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2318-19.
160. See, e.g., Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182 (Mont.
1964) (statutory requirement that land must be dedicated to the public for park and
playground purposes as a condition for approval of a subdivision); Jenad, Inc. v. Scar-
sdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966) (village planning board requirement that a devel-
oper dedicate land to the village for parks or pay a fee in lieu of dedication as a
condition for approval of subdivision plats showing new streets or highways); Pioneer
Trust & Sav. Bank v. Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799 (Ill. 1961) (ordinance required
dedication of a portion of the land in proposed subdivisions for public use as a condi-
tion for subdivision approval); Simpson v. North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297 (Neb. 1980)
(city ordinance required property owners to dedicate property to the city for use as
streets as a condition of acquiring a building permit); Jordan v. Menominee Falls, 137
N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965) (ordinance required dedication of land for school, park or
recreational sites, or payment of an in lieu fee, as a condition for approval of subdivi-
sion plats); Collis v. Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1976) (statute authorized
municipalities to require dedication of land for parks or playgrounds, or payment of
in lieu fees, as a condition of subdivision approval); College Station v. Turtle Rock
Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984) (ordinance required parkland dedication or pay-
ment of in lieu fees as a condition for subdivision plat approval); Call v. West Jordan,
606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979) (ordinance required dedication of seven percent of the land
of a proposed subdivision for flood control, parks and recreational facilities, or pay-
ment of an in lieu fee, as a condition of subdivision approval); Parks v. Watson, 716
F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983) (city refused to vacate platted streets unless developer dedi-
cated land to the city containing various geothermal wells).
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gation conditions in § 404 wetlands development permits. As previ-
ously noted, the compensatory mitigation requirements imposed by
the Corps on landowners generally take the form of nonpossessory
conservation easements or restrictive covenants that merely limit the
uses to which the landowner can put his or her property.'16  Landown-
ers retain the right to exclude the public from their property and the
right to use their land in any way that is not prohibited by the
covenant. 1
62
Such nonpossessory conservation easements and restrictive cove-
nants are fundamentally different in character from the easement of
permanent access in Nollan,6 3 and do not constitute "permanent
physical occupations" of the landowner's property. Since the permit
conditions would not alone constitute a taking, the burden should not
be shifted to the Corps to make an "individualized," "rough propor-
tionality" determination to support the imposition of the conditions
on the permit."6 Instead, the traditional burden should be placed on
the landowner to demonstrate that the challenged permit conditions
do not substantially advance a legitimate state interest.
B. Limiting Dolan to Permit Conditions Developed Through
Adjudication
Even if the Dolan burden shift applies to review of all permit condi-
tions imposed by the government, rather than simply to permit condi-
tions requiring dedication of property or some other per se taking, its
applicability may be limited to conditions that are developed through
adjudication.
As noted above, the Dolan majority conceded that, in cases such as
Agins165 and Pennsylvania Coal,6 6 the Court traditionally placed the
burden on challengers to demonstrate that government regulatory ac-
tions were unconstitutional. 67 However, the Court distinguished Do-
161. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
If the Corps required a landowner, as a condition of a § 404 permit, to dedicate a
portion of its property to the government or to a conservation group for a wildlife
refuge or other conservation purposes, the Dolan burden shift would likely apply.
However, the Corps does not usually require dedication of property as a condition for
a § 404 permit.
162. Conservation easements may allow some limited access to the property by the
easement holder or the Corps to ensure that the landowner is complying with the
terms of the easement.
163. The most obvious and significant difference is that conservation easements and
restrictive covenants do not extinguish the landowners' right to exclude others from
the property.
164. An argument could be made, however, that a permit condition that denies a
landowner economically viable use of his or her land constitutes a per se taking in a
manner similar to a condition that results in a permanent physical occupation of land,
and that the Dolan burden shift should apply in those situations as well.
165. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
166. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
167. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
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lan from Agins and the related cases by noting that the earlier cases
involved challenges to legislative determinations, while Dolan in-
volved an adjudicative determination.'" Arguably, therefore, the Do-
lan burden shift is limited to review of adjudicatory determinations.
The Dolan majority was correct in noting that most of the cases that
established the presumption of constitutionality involved takings chal-
lenges to legislative actions by the government. 169 However, none of
those cases held that the fact that the challenged government action
was a legislative act is a determining factor, and the Dolan Court did
not explain why the traditional presumption of constitutionality estab-
lished in those cases should not apply to decisions made in the course
of adjudication. When the judiciary reviews non-constitutional chal-
lenges to an agency action, the court accords the same level of defer-
ence to the agency's decision regardless of whether the decision is
made through an adjudication or a rulemaking.17 0 Therefore, it is not
clear why the level of deference accorded to the agency on constitu-
tional questions should vary depending on whether the agency acted
pursuant to its legislative or adjudicative authority.
Nevertheless, two things are relatively clear from the Dolan Court's
discussion of the presumption of constitutionality and the burden shift
168. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2320 n.8 (1994).
169. See, e.g., United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52 (1989) (challenge to the
constitutionality of a statutory provision that assessed persons who litigated claims
before an international tribunal a fee to cover the cost of the tribunal to the United
States); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (challenge to the facial constitutionality
of a zoning ordinance); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (challenge to the
constitutionality of a city ordinance that prohibited excavation below the water table);
Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (challenge to the designation of property
as a residential use district in a zoning ordinance).
170. For instance, when a court reviews an agency's legal interpretations of a stat-
ute the agency administers, the court accords the same level of deference to the
agency regardless of whether the agency's decision is made in the context of adjudica-
tion or rulemaking. The analysis in Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), applies to
review of all statutory interpretation by agencies, BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW § 10.35 (3d ed. 1991), and, when a statute does not clearly resolve a
legal question, but delegates authority to the agency to do so, a court will accord the
same level of deference to the agency's legal interpretation when it is developed
through adjudication as when it is developed through rulemaking. Robert A.
Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE
J. ON REG. 1, 42-44, 47-48 (1990).
Similarly, the standard for judicial review of agency factual deterninations under
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") is the same for factual determinations
made through rulemaking or adjudication. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). Although the
standard of review of factual determinations varies depending on whether decisions
are made through formal processes, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F), or informal processes, 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), it does not vary depending on whether the facts are found
through adjudication or rulemaking.
In addition, to the extent that the APA addresses the issue of burden of proof, it
provides that, in the context of formal hearings, "the proponent of a rule or order has
the burden of proof." 5 U.S.C. § 556(d). Once again, the burden of proof for deci-
sions made in adjudications is the same as for decisions made through rulemaking.
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in the context of rulemaking and adjudication. First, to the extent that
the burden shift applies to takings challenges against permit condi-
tions, it applies to challenges against permit conditions that are devel-
oped through adjudication. 17 1 Second, the burden shift might not
apply to takings challenges that are raised against permit conditions
that are imposed pursuant to legislative requirements. 72
As previously discussed, the determination of the nature and extent
of compensatory mitigation required as a condition for a section 404
permit is intimately tied to the functions and values of wetlands that
will be impacted by the development subject to the section 404 permit.
Neither the EPA nor the Corps has promulgated legislative regula-
tions requiring a permittee to provide specific amounts or types of
compensatory mitigation. By their nature, it is preferable that com-
pensatory mitigation conditions are developed through adjudica-
tion. 73 Thus, to the extent that the Dolan burden shift applies to all
171. More precisely, it applies to takings challenges against permit conditions im-
posing dedication requirements that are developed through adjudication.
172. However, although the Dolan Court characterized the action it was reviewing
as "adjudicatory," the conditions were, as Justice Souter pointed out, imposed pursu-
ant to legislative requirements, Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2331 n.* (Souter, J., dissenting).
The City of Tigard's CDC, a legislative enactment, required dedication of open land
for a greenway adjoining and within the floodplain when development is allowed in
the floodplain. Id. at 2314. The CDC also required dedication of land for the pedes-
trian/bicycle path where provided for in the pedestrian/bicycle path plan whenever
development in the Central Business District was allowed. Id. at 2313. Arguably,
therefore, the Dolan court applied its burden shift to review takings challenges to
permit conditions established by legislative action, rather than developed through
adjudication.
On the other hand, though, the precise language of the CDC only requires the
dedication of "sufficient open space" for a greenway when development is allowed
within the floodplain. Id at 2314. Since the City determines the amount and precise
location of the land that must be dedicated to the City in an adjudicative context
when it issues the permit, perhaps the majority was correct in holding that the permit
conditions that were challenged in the case were developed through adjudication,
rather than legislatively. However, the constitutional infirmity that the Court found
with the greenway dedication requirement did not relate to the amount or location of
land that the City required Dolan to dedicate, but rather that the City required Dolan
to dedicate any land to the City at all. Id. at 2320-21. Although the City determined
the amount and location of land to be dedicated by Dolan through adjudication, the
requirement that Dolan dedicate property to the City for the greenway was estab-
lished legislatively. If the burden shift does not apply to permit conditions that are
developed legislatively, as the Dolan Court suggests, the Court should not have ap-
plied the burden shift to review the nature of the dedication requirement.
173. The Corps or the EPA could, in theory, promulgate mitigation regulations that
provided that specific amounts and types of wetlands had to be created, restored, or
enhanced in specific ratios to compensate for specific adverse impacts to functional
values of wetlands. However, there are far too many variables that must be consid-
ered in evaluating the adequacy of compensatory mitigation that make it impossible
for the Corps or the EPA to develop regulations that address the full range of mitiga-
tion circumstances that may arise. For instance, the EPA or the Corps should be
reluctant to provide, through regulation, that a 2:1 mitigation ratio (or some higher
ratio) is required whenever mitigation proposals involve creation of wetlands, as op-
posed to enhancement of wetlands. Depending on the likelihood of success of a par-
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permit conditions imposed by government, rather than merely to con-
ditions imposing dedication requirements, the burden shift will gener-
ally apply to takings challenges raised against the Corps' imposition of
compensatory mitigation requirements as permit conditions in section
404 permits.
C. Shift of the Burden of Production or Persuasion?
Perhaps the most significant ambiguity in the Court's Dolan deci-
sion concerns the nature of the burden that the Court placed on the
government to justify the constitutionality of its actions. 74 It is not
clear whether the Court merely shifted the burden of producing evi-
dence175 to support the permit conditions to the government, or
whether it shifted the burden of production and persuasion. 176
On its face, the "plain language" of the Court's opinion seems to
limit the government's obligation to producing evidence to support its
decision,177 and Justice Souter, in dissent, characterized the shift im-
posed by the Court as a mere shift in the burden of production of
evidence. 178 However, it is possible that the Court shifted the burden
of persuasion as well because the Court abandoned the presumption
of constitutionality for review of government actions pursuant to its
police power and shifted that burden, as Justice Stevens argued in dis-
sent179 and the majority suggested in a footnote. 80
An analysis of the Court's application of the burden shift to review
of the greenway and the bicycle path dedication requirements does
not resolve the issue, either. In both instances, the Court essentially
determined that the government did not produce evidence to support
a prima facie case for its defense.' 8' Either of two conclusions could
ticular wetlands creation proposal, and depending on the functional values provided
by the wetlands that are being created, as compared to the functional values of the
wetlands that were lost to development, a 2:1 ratio may be too small, or too large.
Thus, any regulations promulgated by the Corps or the EPA would have to be specifi-
cally general to allow consideration of that range of variables (i.e., regulations could
provide that "mitigation should ensure a 1:1 replacement of wetlands functions and
values"). Such regulations would, however, leave so much discretion to the Corps
that the compensatory mitigation conditions would, in essence, be developed through
adjudication at the time of permit issuance.
174. "Burden of proof" encompasses both a burden of producing evidence and a
burden of persuasion. JACOB A. STIN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 24.01 (1994).
175. The "burden of production" refers to the burden of going forward with evi-
dence to support a prima facie case. Id. at 24-9, 24-10.
176. The "burden of persuasion" is the burden of providing a specific quantum of
proof to persuade the trier of fact of the validity of a claim or defense. Id. at 24-5.
177. The Court merely requires the government to make "some sort of individual-
ized determination" to support its decision. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20.
178. Id. at 2331.
179. 1d at 2323, 2326.
180. Id. at 2320 n.8.
181. With regard to the greenway dedication requirement, the Court held that
"[t]he city has never said why a public greenway, as opposed to a private one, was
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be drawn from those findings. First, one could conclude that the
Court only shifted the burden of production to the government and
that the government could not meet that burden. Alternatively, one
could conclude that the Court shifted both the burden of production
and the burden of persuasion to the government and, since the gov-
ernment could not satisfy the burden of production, the Court did not
have to address the government's failure to satisfy the burden of
persuasion.
Clearly, a shift in the burden of production alone will be less oner-
ous for the government than a shift in the burden of production and
persuasion. However, even a mere shift in the burden of production
could diminish the government's ability to justify the imposition of
certain conditions in permits if the shift is applied as rigidly as the
Dolan Court applied it to review the bicycle path dedication
requirement. 182
V. IMPACT OF DOLAN ON COMPENSATORY MITIGATION
CONDITIONS
Even if Dolan applies across the board to all permit conditions im-
posed by the government, Dolan will probably have minimal effect on
the Corps' ability to impose compensatory mitigation conditions on
§ 404 permits in a manner that does not constitute a taking. Although
Dolan would shift the burden to the Corps to demonstrate the consti-
tutionality of the conditions, it would merely require the Corps to
required in the interest of flood control." Id. at 2320. Accordingly, the City did not
meet its burden of producing evidence that the nature of the permit condition was
roughly proportional to the impacts of the proposed development. Perhaps if the City
had produced some evidence to support its determination that dedication of the
greenway was required, the Court might have imposed the burden of persuasion on
Dolan to demonstrate that the dedication requirement was not roughly proportional
to the impacts of the redevelopment proposal.
Similarly, with regard to the bicycle path dedication requirement, the Court held
that the City did not produce any evidence that the bicycle path would reduce traffic
congestion that might be caused by the redeveloped proposal. Id. at 2321-22. Per-
haps if the City had produced some evidence to that effect, the Court might have
imposed the burden on Dolan to persuade the Court that the dedication requirement
was unconstitutional.
182. Even though the Court held that "no precise mathematical calculation is re-
quired" to support the government's "individualized determination," it held that the
City did not meet its burden when it made the following findings, which the Court
accepted as true, to support the bicycle path dedication requirement: (1) Dolan's pro-
posed redevelopment would increase traffic on the streets of the Central Business
District by generating roughly 435 additional trips per day; (2) "Dedications for
streets, sidewalks, and other public ways are generally reasonable exactions to avoid
congestion from a proposed property use;" and (3) Creation of the bicycle path
"could offset some of the traffic demand... and lessen the increase in traffic conges-
tion." Id. at 2321-22.
The Dolan Court held that the City failed to satisfy its burden because it said that
the bicycle path could offset traffic demand, instead of saying that it would offset
traffic demand. Id.
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demonstrate that the nature and extent of the mitigation requirements
were reasonably related to the impacts of the proposed development
subject to the § 404 permit.
That burden should not be a difficult one for the Corps to bear be-
cause the Corps' goal in framing mitigation conditions, pursuant to the
Clean Water Act, its regulations, and the MOA with the EPA, is to
require the developer to replace the functions and values of wetlands
that are adversely affected by the development that is subject to the
permit.183 Pursuant to regulations and agency policy, the mitigation
requirements are "based solely on the values and functions" of wet-
lands impacted by the permitted activity, and the scope and degree of
compensatory mitigation must be appropriate to the scope and degree
of those impacts." 4 Thus, the nature and extent of the Corps' com-
pensatory mitigation requirements are intimately tied to the impacts
of the development. 85 Consequently, it should not be difficult for the
Corps to demonstrate that the nature or extent of a compensatory
mitigation permit condition is reasonably related to the impacts of the
development authorized by a § 404 permit.
Importantly, the Dolan Court explicitly sanctioned permit condi-
tions similar to compensatory mitigation conditions in section 404 per-
mits when asserting that "[i]f petitioner's proposed development had
somehow encroached on existing greenway space in the city, it would
have been reasonable to require petitioner to provide some alterna-
tive greenway space for the public either on her property or
elsewhere.' 1 86
Yet the actual impact of Dolan on compensatory mitigation permit
conditions cannot be. assessed until the Court clarifies the nature of
the burden imposed on the government to justify its actions as consti-
tutional. If Dolan imposes the burden of persuasion on the govern-
ment, or imposes the burden of production on the government as
forcefully as it did in Dolan with regard to the bicycle path dedication
183. See supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text. More specifically, mitigation
strives to achieve a goal of no net loss of wetlands values and functions by replacing
the values and functions of the wetlands that are adversely affected by the permitted
activity after all appropriate efforts to avoid or minimize the impacts have been
exhausted.
184. MOA, supra note 46, at 9211-12; 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(r)(2) (1994).
185. In contrast to the Dolan Court's suggestions, it is more likely that the compen-
satory mitigation conditions developed by the Corps through case-by-case adjudica-
tion will be reasonably related to the impacts of the development subject to a § 404
permit than conditions created legislatively. Since a legislature, or an agency promul-
gating legislative regulations, would not be able to anticipate every situation in which
mitigation conditions might be imposed, it would likely craft rules that, in specific
situations, were overbroad, requiring more mitigation than is necessary in light of the
impacts of the permitted activity.
Since the Corps develops the conditions through adjudication, however, it can tailor
the nature and extent of the mitigation requirements to the impacts of the permitted
activity.
186. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2321.
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requirement, it might be more difficult for the Corps to defend certain
types of compensatory mitigation conditions described below. In the
long run, however, this would work against developers because it
would decrease a developer's compensatory mitigation options and in-
crease the likelihood that the § 404 permit would be denied.187
The identification and quantification of wetlands' functional values
is not an exact science.188 Different types of wetlands provide differ-
ent levels of functions and values. Even identical types of wetlands
may provide different levels of functions and values. 189 Many of the
functions and values provided by wetlands are tied to their location,
and the same functions and values cannot be provided by wetlands in
a different location.190 Comparison of the values and functions pro-
vided by different types of wetlands in different locations is, therefore,
inexact.' 9' For instance, is a wetland that provides flood prevention in
a heavily populated area, but does not provide habitat to any endan-
gered species, more or less valuable than a wetland that provides
habitat to endangered species in an area where there is little or no
human population? Similarly, are the recreational values provided by
one wetland more or less important than the harvesting opportunities
provided by another? Since the identification and quantification of
functional values, and the comparison of different types of functional
values, are inexact sciences, if Dolan imposes a burden of persuasion
187. As explained below, to the extent that Dolan will impact any compensatory
mitigation permit conditions, it will probably only impact conditions that require off-
site, out-of-kind mitigation, or mitigation at replacement ratios greater than 1:1.
Since the Corps/EPA MOA establishes a preference for on-site, in-kind compensatory
mitigation, if the Corps is requiring off-site, out-of-kind mitigation as a permit condi-
tion, it is probably because on-site, in-kind mitigation is not available, or because the
developer suggested the off-site mitigation. In either case, striking down the permit
condition eliminates a way for the permit applicant to satisfy the mitigation require-
ments of the Clean Water Act and to obtain a permit to develop his property. If on-
site mitigation is not feasible, and off-site mitigation is foreclosed, the obvious alterna-
tive for the Corps is to deny the landowner's permit application.
188. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text. Courts would probably defer to
the Corps' determination of the functions and values provided by particular wetlands
instead of identifying them on their own.
189. McElfish, supra note 26, at L-9.
190. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
191. President Clinton's wetlands agenda identifies the lack of a scientific basis for
ranking functionally distinct and diverse wetland types as a fundamental impediment
to a nationwide classification system for wetlands. AGENDA, supra note 55, at 797-98.
Several bills that were proposed during the last session of Congress would have
established a nationwide classification system for wetlands. See, e.g., The Compre-
hensive Wetlands Conservation and Management Act of 1993, H.R. 1330, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993); The Wetlands Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S. 2506, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1994).
The Clinton Administration opposed those bills because of the lack of a scientifi-
cally valid basis for comparison among wetland types, but also because the Adminis-
tration estimated that it would cost more than $500 million to classify and map all of
the remaining wetlands in the contiguous 48 states alone. AGENDA, supra note 55, at
797-98.
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or a strict burden of production on the government, Dolan could
make it more difficult for the Corps to justify off-site, out-of-kind miti-
gation conditions, or mitigation conditions that require a replacement
ratio that is greater than 1:1.192
If the Corps, as a § 404 permit condition, requires a developer to
create, restore, or enhance the same amount of the same type of wet-
lands that are being destroyed, on the same site where the wetlands
are being destroyed, it should be fairly simple for the Corps to demon-
strate that the nature and extent of the permit condition is "roughly
proportional" to the impacts of the permitted activity, even under the
most stringent application of the burden. In such a case, the reasona-
bleness of the requirement is apparent on its face. Since the Corps/
EPA MOA expresses a preference for on-site, in-kind mitigation,193
many mitigation conditions should be similarly easy to justify.
However, there are also instances in which the Corps imposes con-
ditions on § 404 permits that require creation, enhancement, or resto-
ration of off-site, out-of-kind wetlands as compensatory mitigation, or
require compensatory mitigation in replacement ratios greater than
1:1. There are several reasons for this. First, the Corps might require
off-site compensatory mitigation when on-site mitigation is not feasi-
ble or practicable. 94 Off-site or out-of-kind compensatory mitigation
might also be required because it my be environmentally preferable
to on-site mitigation in some cases.' 9 Finally, the Corps may require
a permittee to create, restore, or enhance more acres of wetlands than
are impacted by a permitted discharge either because the functional
values of the compensatory wetlands are less than the functional val-
192. Wetlands created, enhanced, or restored as a condition of mitigation will inevi-
tably provide some different functions and values than the wetlands impacted by the
permitted discharge since no two wetlands are exactly alike. Whether a court con-
cludes that the difference in functions and values is significant enough to render the
condition unconstitutional will depend to some degree on how much deference the
court gives to the Corps' identification, quantification and comparison of wetlands
values and functions. If the Court imposes a burden of persuasion or a strict burden
of production on the government, the Court may be less likely to accept the Corps'
findings regarding the identification, quantification, and comparison of wetlands val-
ues and functions.
193. MOA, supra note 46, at 9212.
194. Id. For instance, the discharge site may lack any remaining land with appro-
priate hydrology to support wetlands creation, restoration, or enhancement.
195. See supra note 81. "Out-of-kind" mitigation may also provide a variety of envi-
ronmental benefits. For instance, it may "restore a locally rarer wetland or provide
more of a particularly needed function like flood control. It may enable regulators to
replace the historic assemblage of wetlands in an area, or to 'trade up' . . . to achieve
broader watershed enhancement or wildlife management goals." McElfish, supra
note 26, at L-14.
However, to the extent that the Corps purposefully imposes mitigation require-
ments that it knows will provide a net gain in wetlands values and functions, it runs
the risk that a court might find that the nature and extent of such conditions is not
"reasonably related" to the impacts of the permitted discharge upon which the condi-
tions are imposed.
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ues of the wetlands impacted by the permitted discharge,196 or be-
cause there is a likelihood that the creation, enhancement, or
restoration of the compensatory wetlands will not succeed.'97
In each of these situations, however, it will be more difficult for the
Corps to prove that the nature and extent of the compensatory mitiga-
tion requirement is reasonably related to the impacts of the permitted
discharge than it is to justify an on-site, in-kind, 1:1 compensatory mit-
igation permit condition. For instance, "off-site" wetlands will not
provide precisely the same functions and values as wetlands created,
restored, or enhanced on the site of a discharge.' 98 "Out-of-kind"
wetlands will also provide some different functions and values than
the wetlands they are replacing."9 Proof that the nature and extent of
the compensatory mitigation requirement is reasonably related to the
impact of the permitted discharge in those situations will entail identi-
fication and quantification of the wetlands functions and values, and
comparisons among different values and functions. The degree of suc-
cess that the Corps has in defending those conditions will depend, to
some extent, on the degree to which a court accepts the Corps' com-
parison of the value of different functions and values.
Compensatory mitigation conditions that require creation, enhance-
ment, or restoration of wetlands at ratios greater than 1:1 are the most
likely targets for takings challenges under Dolan. The argument is
rather straightforward. If a permitted discharge adversely impacts a
variety of values and functions provided by ten acres of wetlands, and
the Corps requires a permittee to create, enhance, or restore twenty
acres of wetlands, the permittee might argue that the "extent" of the
permit condition is not reasonably related to the impacts of the per-
mitted discharge. On its face, the permittee's argument has appeal.
196. Salvesen, supra note 62, at 40.
197. Id For instance, if there is a 50% chance that the wetlands created, restored,
or enhanced as compensatory mitigation will fail, the Corps might require the permit-
tee to create, restore, or enhance wetlands at a 2:1 replacement ratio.
198. Off-site wetlands will never provide exactly the same functions and values.
For instance, wetlands that are created, restored or enhanced along the flyway of
certain migratory birds will not provide the same habitat support values as wetlands
that were degraded in another location, which may have been located in the flyway of
the same or different birds.
To some extent, due to the Corps' requirement that off-site mitigation must be lo-
cated within the same watershed as the wetlands impacted by the permitted discharge,
it is more likely that the off-site mitigation will provide similar functions and values as
the degraded wetlands.
199. As one commentator has noted:
There is great variability among wetland types. Isolated prairie potholes of
the upper midwest bear little resemblance to the lush grasses of the Ever-
glades or the intertidal zones of the Atlantic coast .... And the functions
wetlands perform are diverse and dissimilar.... A wetland that provides
erosion control or flood storage may have little significance for habitat or
groundwater recharge, for example. These differences make comparisons
(and compensation tradeoffs) among different wetland types quite difficult.
McElfish, supra note 26, at L-9.
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However, replacement ratios that are greater than 1:1 can often be
justified because of the difference in values and functions provided by
the compensatory wetlands and the degraded wetlands, or by the like-
lihood that restoration, creation, or enhancement of the compensatory
wetlands will not succeed. Once again, however, the proof that the
Corps can provide to support the mitigation condition will often in-
volve comparisons among different values and functions of wetlands,
and the degree of success that the Corps has in defending those condi-
tions will depend, to some extent, on the degree to which a court ac-
cepts the Corps' comparison of the value of different functions and
values.
If Dolan were to make it more difficult for the Corps to defend
permit conditions that require off-site, out-of-kind compensatory miti-
gation, or mitigation at replacement ratios greater than 1:1, mitigation
banking proposals might become less attractive. Since mitigation
banks are used to compensate for the impacts of several different de-
velopment projects, usually in different locations, it is impossible to
locate them on the site of each project.200 By its nature, therefore,
mitigation banking usually involves off-site mitigation. Similarly, be-
cause mitigation banks may be designed before the wetlands for which
it is compensating are identified, in many cases, the mitigation banked
wetlands will be a different type (out-of-kind) than the wetlands de-
graded by a § 404 permitted activity.210 Finally, to provide economic
stability to a bank, the Corps may often authorize the bank to grant
credits before it can determine whether the wetlands in the bank will
be successfully created or restored. To ensure that mitigation ulti-
mately results in a 1:1 replacement of functions and values, and in
light of the uncertainty of the success of those banks, the Corps may
often require acreage replacement ratios greater than 1:1 from those
banks.
In light of the environmental and economic benefits that mitigation
banking provides, it would be unfortunate if Dolan were applied by
the judiciary in a manner that limited the viability of such banks. As a
practical matter, however, it is unlikely that takings challenges will be
raised against mitigation banking permit conditions. Since the Corps/
EPA MOA on mitigation expresses a preference for on-site, in-kind
compensatory mitigation, the Corps will generally only authorize a
permittee to satisfy compensatory mitigation requirements through
200. Mitigation banking is made more defensible by the fact that the area over
which mitigation credits can be used is limited by the Corps, and mitigation credits
usually cannot be used outside of the watershed of the bank.
201. However, in some instances, the permit or memorandum that creates a bank
may limit the types of wetlands for which the mitigation banked wetlands can serve as
compensation. Even if it does not, in determining whether a mitigation bank can
provide appropriate compensatory mitigation, the Corps is still guided by the MOA,
which establishes a preference for in-kind compensatory mitigation. MOA, supra
note 46, at 9211-12.
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mitigation banking when the permittee proposes to do so, and the
Corps determines that it is appropriate to accept mitigation banked
wetlands as compensatory wetlands. The permittee receives economic
benefits from satisfying compensatory mitigation requirements
through mitigation banking, and the permittee is spared the responsi-
bility of maintaining and monitoring the mitigation efforts. It is un-
likely, therefore, that a permittee who has convinced the Corps that it
is appropriate to include a permit condition that essentially requires
the creation, restoration, or enhancement of off-site, out-of-kind wet-
lands, will subsequently turn around and argue that the permit condi-
tion is not reasonably related to the impacts of the permitted
discharge because the compensatory mitigation is not on-site and in-
kind.2 °2
CONCLUSION
Although property rights advocates have hailed Dolan v. City of
Tigard as a "landmark" takings decision, the true impact of the case
will probably be much more limited. Even after Dolan, governmental
regulation will constitute a taking only if it does not substantially ad-
vance a legitimate state interest or denies a landowner all economi-
cally viable use of his or her land. Dolan did not narrow the interests
that qualify as "legitimate state interests," nor did Dolan reject the
"reasonableness" test traditionally used by the Court to determine
whether regulation "substantially advances" a legitimate state inter-
est. Although Dolan shifted the burden to the government to demon-
strate that a particular type of government regulation "substantially
advances legitimate state interests," it may have merely shifted the
burden of producing evidence to the government. The ultimate bur-
den of persuasion may remain, as it has traditionally been, with the
claimant.
Moreover, the reach of Dolan is also in question. A strong argu-
ment can be made that the Dolan burden shift only applies to judicial
review of permit conditions, developed through adjudication, that im-
pose dedication requirements depriving landowners of their right to
exclude the public from their property or impose other requirements
that constitute per se takings.
Even if Dolan applies to all permit conditions developed through
adjudication, it should have little impact on the Corps' imposition of
compensatory mitigation conditions in § 404 permits. Pursuant to reg-
ulations and agency policy, the nature and extent of the Corps' com-
202. The permittee might challenge the amount of mitigation banked wetlands re-
quired as compensation if the replacement ratio exceeds 1:1. However, to the extent
that a permit includes a condition that requires the permittee to satisfy mitigation
requirements by purchasing credits from a mitigation bank, the condition will only be
included in the permit if the Corps and the permittee have agreed on the condition.
That should decrease the likelihood that the permittee will challenge the condition.
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pensatory mitigation permit conditions are intimately tied to the
impacts of the discharge authorized by a § 404 permit. Thus, in almost
all cases, the conditions should satisfy the Dolan requirement that the
nature and extent of permit conditions must be "roughly propor-
tional" (i.e., reasonably related) to the impacts of the development
authorized by a permit. The Corps' compensatory mitigation analysis
is a far cry from the "regulatory extortion" that has been consistently
condemned by the Court. Compensatory mitigation requirements do
not impose a burden on landowners that the public as a whole should
bear. Instead, such requirements impose an obligation on landowners
to limit the damage that their actions will cause the public. In light of
the traditional takings analysis, and pursuant to Dolan, they are
clearly constitutional.

